The Effects of Knowledge Versus Production Boundaries on Firm Survival through Systemic Technological Change by Woroniecki, Jean
THE EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE VERSUS PRODUCTION 
BOUNDARIES ON FIRM SURVIVAL  
THROUGH SYSTEMIC TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
by 
Jean Lauren Woroniecki  
Bachelor of Science, Cornell University, 2005 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Katz Graduate School of Business in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Pittsburgh 
2013 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
KATZ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Jean Lauren Woroniecki 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
April 22, 2013 
and approved by 
Dissertation Advisor: Susan K. Cohen, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Frits K. Pil, Ph.D., Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Ravi Madhavan, Ph.D., Professor, University of Pittsburgh 
Mark Kryder, Ph.D., University Professor, Carnegie Mellon University 
Jorge Walter, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, George Washington University 
 
 
 ii 
  
Copyright © by Jean Lauren Woroniecki 
2013 
 iii 
Firms that develop complex products are at greater risk from systemic technological change, 
which alters the way product components work together, and can also affect the nature of 
demand for a product.  We ask what combinations of knowledge and production boundaries best 
position firms that make complex products to survive systemic change.  Some work suggests that 
vertical integration might improve survival but other research posits that maintaining broad 
knowledge boundaries could be sufficient, as it enables efficiency through outsourcing yet 
retains effectiveness in integrating component technologies. We propose that the answer depends 
on whether we focus on technological or market boundaries, and that while in general broad 
boundaries favor adaptation to systemic change, integrating downstream from manufacturing can 
hinder adaptation.  In addition, we argue that integration into the manufacture of components 
may be more critical than is suggested in prior work.  Our longitudinal study of systemic change 
in the hard disk drive industry provides preliminary support for these predictions. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
A small but promising stream of research has argued that firms can ‘know’ more than they ‘do’ 
and has suggested that this might be a beneficial configuration of organizational boundaries for 
complex products comprised of many component technologies (e.g. Brusoni, Prencipe, Pavitt, 
2001; Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 1997; Prencipe, 1997).  While firms may be incapable of 
efficiently producing all of the components comprising complex products (i.e. they might lack 
the requisite scale or relevant skills), they nonetheless need to understand the component 
technologies to effectively integrate them (Brusoni et al., 2001; Ciravegna and Maielli, 2012; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Takeishi, 2002). 
Empirical evidence supporting this argument, however, remains elusive.  Previous studies 
on firms’ production boundaries—defined as the degree to which firms have integrated into the 
manufacturing of component technologies (Brusoni, et. al., 2001; Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 
1997; Sorenson, 2003) and distribution and sales activities (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; 
John and Weitz, 1988; Rothaermel, 2001, 2005)—offer conflicting evidence as to whether broad 
or narrow production boundaries provide adaptive advantages in the face of technological 
change1. While some studies found a positive effect for broad production boundaries (e.g. Negro 
1 Studies have more often focused on technological uncertainty. Balakrishnan (1986), Harrigan (1984, 1985), Jones 
and Hill (1987), Sorenson (2003), John and Weitz (1988) and Klein, Frazier Roth (1990) focus on environmental 
volatility without typifying its different sources and specific effects. Tripsas (1997), Rothaermel (2001, 2005) focus 
on technological change that is competence destroying, while Kapoor and Adner (2012) focus on architectural and 
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and Sorenson, 2006; Sorenson, 2003), others found negative effects (e.g. Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt, 1986; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Afuah, 2001).  The situation becomes further 
complicated when products are technologically complex, i.e. comprised of component 
technologies that may change at different speeds.  While transaction cost economics (‘TCE’) 
explains firms’ production boundaries as resulting from firms’ efforts to govern individual 
transactions efficiently (Williamson, 1985), governance modes that are efficient for individual 
transactions (i.e. manufacturing of individual components) are not necessarily efficient for 
managing system-level outcomes.  For example, to accommodate new component technologies 
firms might need to alter their product architectures and manufacturing processes, the 
technological systems that support a product line.  They might also need to adapt the set of 
activities used to market and sell new products and to educate and learn from customers, the 
commercialization systems that support a product line.    
Recent studies have further suggested that a firm’s knowledge boundary choices may 
enhance a firm’s ability to manage change to a firm’s technological systems (e.g. Brusoni et al., 
2001; Ciravegna and Maielli, 2012; Takeishi, 2002). A firm’s knowledge boundaries are defined 
by the content domains a firm understands, and are reflected in codified knowledge and 
knowledge that resides within employees and a firm’s routines (Butler, 2012; Carlile, 2002; 
Garicano, 2012; Grant, 1996; Kogut, 1996).  Broader knowledge boundaries (i.e. knowing about 
more content domains) allow firms to successfully outsource the production of product 
components while still maintaining the capability for integrating them into the product (a key 
technological system) (Brusoni et al., 2001; Ciravegna and Maielli, 2012; Takeishi, 2002).  In 
component enabled technological change. We focus on technological change that alters critical relationships 
comprising the technology and commercialization systems that are integral to a firm’s ability to serve particular 
customers, and hence the firm’s performance in a market. 
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addition, studies have found that firms need to have a broad knowledge base in place to 
incorporate new technologies that have system-wide ramifications (i.e. cause or require other 
components and subsystems to be redesigned) (e.g. Ciravegna and Maielli, 2012; Takeishi, 
2002).  Thus, knowledge boundary choices are a critical aspect of firms’ capacities to manage 
systemic change.   
Beyond these important insights, however, unresolved questions remain. With one 
notable exception (Kapoor and Adner, 2012), prior research has failed to provide a clear set of 
contingencies for when broad or narrow organizational boundaries are appropriate. Moreover, 
studies have not considered how the knowledge and production boundaries that affect market 
and technology systems might jointly affect firms’ capacities to adapt to systemic technological 
change. While some prior work stresses the importance of communication between knowledge-
producing activities and traditional production functions for fostering the organizational 
capabilities that are needed to adapt to technological change (Hoetker, 2005; Takeishi, 2002), 
even this work fails to address what happens when technological change necessitates adaptation 
in both the technology and market systems which support a product class.  Moreover, studies in 
the TCE paradigm (in which most research on production boundaries is grounded) rarely 
distinguish the types of technological change firms might confront and instead measure 
technological uncertainty simply as volatility.  This approach is problematic as it risks conflating 
many different kinds of technological change with distinctive organizational and contractual 
implications. 
In sum, it remains unclear from the existing literature whether broad knowledge 
boundaries, broad production boundaries, or some combination of each will better prepare a firm 
to adapt to technological change that disrupts established technology and market systems.  
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Addressing these open issues, our study’s intent is to develop a better understanding of how a 
firm’s boundary choices affect its adaptive capacities in industries that are characterized by 
frequent, systemic changes.  In particular, we examine how the breadth of a firm’s knowledge 
boundaries and whether a firm has narrow or broad production boundaries determine a firm’s 
survival prospects through systemic changes that affect a firm’s technological and market 
systems. By examining their independent and joint effects, we shed light on the ambiguous 
findings in prior work on the adaptation benefits of boundary choices regarding one or the other. 
We further go beyond prior work to investigate the different effects of knowledge and production 
boundaries regarding the technology and markets a firm participates in. We specifically focus on 
a setting where technological change has frequently disrupted the product architectures and 
manufacturing systems supporting a complex product, as well as the market systems used to 
commercialize it. During the time period we study, standards that specify how component 
technologies would interface with one another alternated between closed, proprietary and open 
standards, prompting dramatic shifts in firms’ organizational boundary choices. 
Our theory is supported by our findings. We find that broad technology production 
boundaries increase a firm’s chances of survival, and have an enhanced effect on firm survival 
when paired with broad technology knowledge boundaries. We further find that broad market 
knowledge boundaries increase a firm’s survival odds, but have a decreased effect on firm 
survival when paired with broad market production boundaries. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. We illustrate that when firms 
encounter systemic change, their market boundaries confer adaptive advantages or disadvantages 
differently than do their technological boundaries. Broad technology production boundaries 
increase a firm’s survival, but broad market production boundaries do not. We also add to the 
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literature which examines performance trade-offs associated with a firm’s vertical boundaries.   
Specifically, we show that broad market knowledge boundaries can offset the adaptive 
disadvantages associated with broad market production boundaries. Although the statistical 
significance is weaker (reflecting measurement challenges), our findings suggest that broad 
technological knowledge augments the adaptive advantages of broad technological boundaries.   
Our study extends recent work that seeks to understand how knowledge and production 
boundaries affect firm capabilities for adaptation and innovation by including market boundaries 
and by studying a firm’s survival through systemic change.  Unlike in notable previous studies 
(e.g. Kapoor and Adner, 2012; Brusoni, et. al., 2001), in the context we studied, systemic change 
frequently altered the relevant metrics for assessing product performance.  
1.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 Typology of Technological Change 
The literature identifies a variety of ways that technological change disrupts2 established 
systems.  Henderson and Clark (1990) introduced the term architectural innovation, in which 
knowledge about individual components is still relevant, but knowledge about component 
interactions is no longer relevant. Tushman and Anderson (1986) describe a competence-
destroying technological discontinuity as a situation where the processes, skills, and knowledge 
2These authors (Christensen, 1993; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) refined the 
definition of technological uncertainty into different categories to indicate how large the change was from either a 
firm level or market-level perspective. Smaller changes were considered incremental, while larger changes were 
considered radical. 
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bases for an older technology are no longer relevant or have become dramatically less valuable 
in a particular market.  Christensen (1993) describes disruptive change as a shift in the criteria 
which define the dominant trajectory of performance improvement in established markets.  
Each of these typologies highlights important aspects of technological change that are 
likely present to varying degrees in most substantive innovations.  The label architectural 
innovation has been used to emphasize change in the technological systems – particularly how 
components relate to one another (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1992; Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1994), while competence-destroying innovation encompasses the routines and 
processes comprising an organizational system (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986, 1990).  Disruptive innovation, as Christensen (1993) uses the term, emphasizes 
how innovation can challenge established market systems.  
We define systemic change as a technological change that disrupts one (or more) of three 
systems that support a firm’s product line: the technological system, which delimits what a firm 
can make and includes the knowledge embodied in the R&D function and the products it 
produces, as well as manufacturing knowledge and the processes which comprise this function 
(e.g. Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990); the organization system, which 
defines how a firm accomplishes and coordinates R&D and manufacturing through structure and 
routines (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Rosenberg, 1976); 
and the market system, which defines how a firm reaches a market and derives profits from it, 
including its approach to marketing and distribution (e.g. Tripsas, 1997; Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Rothaermel 2001, 2005). We focus on disruptions to the technological and 
market systems (see Figure 1 for a diagram of organizational systems/functions that can be 
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affected by systemic change). Appendix C summarizes studies that address change in the three 
systems. 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Systems/Functions Affected by Systemic Change 
 
1.1.2 Systemic Change's Effects on a Firm's Systems 
Systemic change occurs in a firm’s technological systems when the components of a system – 
whether it be the product or the processes used to manufacture it – must relate to each other in a 
new way (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994).  Although much of the 
firm’s knowledge base may still be relevant, to adapt, firms must overcome organizational inertia 
to engage in new problem-solving processes and to determine how to realign the components of 
the system (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Rosenberg, 1976; Tushman and Andersen, 1986). 
Systemic change occurs frequently in complex products, which are comprised of multiple 
components progressing technologically at different rates, and remains a challenge for firms in 
high-tech industries (Brusoni, et. al, 2001). Firms that offer complex products may need to 
redesign the device each time a component technology shifts and affects how other components 
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function, as this type of change alters their joint influence on the performance of the product. 
Systemic technological change also presents a significant challenge for firms’ manufacturing 
choices, as relates to its technological systems.  Manufacturing methods may shift to new 
processes with new materials, and new parameters and specifications may be necessary for 
making each component, in order for these components to interface correctly within the device.  
Systemic change can also affect a firm’s market system by creating new markets, with 
new customer bases and corresponding customer needs. A firm’s market system consists of a 
firm’s investments in marketing, distribution, and sales networks and the accompanying market 
knowledge bases to commercialize its technological products. Christensen and Rosenbloom 
(1995) describe a firm’s commercialization system as “the context within which a firm competes 
and solves customer problems,” which focuses a firm on creating value for its existing 
customers. A firm’s market/commercialization system and its market knowledge base may 
discourage it from investing in new markets that seem too small to be commercially viable. 
Firms may require knowledge that helps them to recognize emerging opportunities (e.g. 
Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Zhou and Li, 2012) with different customer needs, 
applications and requirements as compared to the existing customer base (Christensen, 1993; 
Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995).  
Finally, systemic change can affect a firm’s organizational system, the routines and 
processes through which a firm researches, designs, develops, and delivers its products to 
customers. In order to adapt to systemic change, firms may need to change their organizational 
structure and routines to accommodate the shifts in R&D and manufacturing. Firms may actually 
be limited in their ability to respond to change by their existing methods of coordination, 
decision-making, and communication that are rigid and have evolved over a long period of time. 
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Systemic change creates new opportunities for firms to profit, but organizational processes may 
inhibit firms’ abilities to recognize the opportunities and respond appropriately (Christensen and 
Overdorf, 2000). Prior literature has established the difficulty established firms have encountered 
when systemic change occurs, because rigidities in their existing processes are difficult to 
overcome (e.g. Christensen, 1993). In our study, we focus on the technological and market 
systems, as these systems are more easily studied than the organizational system, which is 
internal, not easily codified, and difficult to measure. 
 
1.1.3 Systemic Change’s Effects on a Firm’s Technological Boundaries 
Prior literature has found multiple explanations for firms’ production boundary choices. The 
TCE literature indicates that firms should make production boundary choices based on the 
governance mode that delivers the lowest sum of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 
1985). It may cost more for an organization to govern an activity in the market than it costs for a 
firm to manage the activity internally. This may be because the production activity is difficult to 
monitor when performed outside the firm, creating severe challenges for adaptation when costs 
or performance outcomes diverge from expectations.  When it is difficult for a firm to make and 
enforce contracts, such as when the environment is uncertain, the activity is more likely to be 
moved within firm boundaries (Holstrom, 1999; Williamson, 1981, 1985, 1991). When 
technological change occurs, firms may have different knowledge than their suppliers do, which 
can increase coordination costs between the firm and its supplier as specifications are modified 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Firms that move production in-house may want additional power 
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over their activities, in order to increase managerial control over outcomes and to decrease 
uncertainty and improve firm performance (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Systemic technological change can alter the efficiency and effectiveness of a particular 
boundary choice, and the boundary choices made at a point in time can affect a firm’s ability to 
adapt to subsequent systemic change.  The literature does not make clear what configuration of 
boundaries is most advantageous for adapting to this type of technological change. With 
continuously changing technologies, contracts pertaining to components may be necessarily 
incomplete, which would encourage broader production boundaries as firms integrate to avoid 
transaction costs (Kapoor and Adner, 2012). Firms that produce more components in-house 
might respond faster to technological change if they can develop the skills needed to incorporate 
the new technology into existing systems faster internally than these integrative skills can be 
accessed through the market (Negro and Sorenson, 2006; Sorenson, 2003).  On the other hand, 
when component technologies are evolving, it may be preferable for firms to maintain narrow 
production boundaries until major technological uncertainties are resolved. Firms that maintain 
broad boundaries accumulate more assets and knowledge of components and interactions that 
could become obsolete with new technology, increasing the difficulty and cost of adjusting 
capabilities to the new technology.  By contrast, firms with narrow production boundaries would 
be free of obsolete manufacturing assets, and also have the ability to switch between suppliers as 
they try out variants of an emerging technology (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Adner and 
Kapoor, 2010; Afuah, 2001). 
An implicit assumption in some of this work is that when technologies change, firms can 
easily test out the new technologies before committing to them.  This implies that an open 
standard exists, which enables new component or manufacturing technologies to be dropped into 
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the existing system with minimal change to other parts of the technology system.  An open 
standard would enable firms to easily incorporate components from suppliers and create a 
functional device.  However, it is often the case that a change in one component disrupts other 
parts of the product and/or manufacturing system (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 
1992).  It is unclear from the previous literature, whether broad or narrow production boundaries 
enable adaptation to systemic changes and how the breadth of knowledge boundaries affects a 
firm’s abilities to adapt.  What constitutes an efficient governance mode for changes in the 
production of individual components may not necessarily be efficient for changes in the 
technological system (Hoetker, 2005; Kapoor and Adner, 2012). In particular, technological 
progress in one component may alter what is needed from other components within a device, 
forcing firms to make architectural changes in order to improve overall device performance 
(Funk, 2009; Rosenberg, 1976).  If the affected components are outsourced, a firm could find 
these changes difficult to incorporate as its suppliers would need to adapt the components in 
unanticipated ways.  These difficult-to-predict systemic outcomes make it challenging for firms 
to tailor individual transaction decisions to adapt successfully to systemic change (Brusoni et al., 
2001; Rosenberg, 1976). 
 
1.1.4 Systemic Change’s Effects on a Firm’s Market Boundaries 
A firm’s market knowledge boundaries can be extended by participating in multiple product and 
geographic markets and might increase a firm’s likelihood of surviving systemic change if it 
enables a firm to find and exploit a new market opportunity quickly (e.g. Gavetti, Levinthal, 
Rivkin, 2005; Zhou and Li, 2012; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Taylor and Greve (2006) and 
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Chesbrough (2003) found that firms with broader knowledge bases were better able to innovate 
and better able to find market opportunities for their new innovations. This market knowledge 
can aid a firm’s efforts to commercialize products that address these new market demands 
(Christensen 1993, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001, 2005). Zhou and Li (2012) found that firms were 
better able to innovate radically when they possessed a broad market knowledge base.  
Because systemic change creates new markets, it also affects a firm’s market production 
boundaries, or a firm’s method of commercializing its technological products (Christensen, 
1993).  Authors (e.g. Rothaermel, 2001, 2005; Tripsas, 1997) have acknowledged the importance 
of a firm’s market production boundaries (consisting of in-house sales networks, marketing 
teams and investments in distribution channels) for the successful commercialization of new 
technology. Tripsas (1997) and Rothaermel (2001) showed that firms with relevant 
complementary assets, including downstream marketing and sales and distribution capabilities, 
were more successful after a technological change. On the other hand, older marketing and 
distribution assets can create information asymmetries that make a firm less likely to invest in a 
new market, and less likely to address the needs of a new customer base (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995). Thus, these complementary assets (and their accompanying capabilities) 
may no longer be useful for commercializing this new technology in these new market spaces. 
Appendix C contains a table with a literature review on market and technology knowledge and 
production boundaries. 
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1.1.5 Adaptation through Knowledge and Production Boundaries 
Acknowledging the challenge that systemic change presents, more recent work has adopted a 
knowledge-based perspective to consider how what firms know, in contrast to what they make, 
affects their success in adapting to technological change (Brusoni et al., 2001; Kapoor and 
Adner, 2012).  Firms with broader knowledge boundaries may be better able to recognize new 
market opportunities and to redesign products with new component configurations to address the 
new customer requirements created by systemic change (Brusoni et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Takeishi, 2002; Zhou and Li, 2012).  This, in turn, would allow firms with broader production 
boundaries to incorporate technological changes into a product and bring the new technology to 
market more quickly (Negro and Sorenson, 2006). Kapoor and Adner (2012) found that firms 
with broad production boundaries had a faster time-to-market than firms with narrow production 
boundaries. However, they also found that firms with narrow production boundaries had 
performance benefits when they also had broad knowledge boundaries on outsourced 
components.   Together, these works indicate the importance of considering a firm’s knowledge 
and production boundary choices together, as both can affect a firm’s survival prospects and 
capabilities for addressing systemic changes.  But it is unclear from the existing literature when 
firms are best served by maintaining broad knowledge boundaries, when they also need broad 
production boundaries, and when they should retain breadth in only one of these domains. 
In this study, we consider the effects that broad technology and market production and 
knowledge boundaries have on firms’ abilities to adapt to systemic change that affects a firm’s 
technological and market systems. A firm’s technology knowledge boundaries are defined by the 
technology domains in which it has research and/or design experience (e.g. as described by 
patent classes) and thus understands sufficiently to employ in the design of new products or 
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processes. A firm’s technology production boundaries are defined by the component 
technologies in which it has manufacturing experience and thus understands sufficiently to 
convert designs into tangible devices. We distinguish firms that have broad technology 
production boundaries (if they manufacture component technologies) from those with narrow 
boundaries (if they do not manufacture component technologies), and measure technology 
knowledge boundary breadth as the number of component subclasses in which a firm has 
patented.  A firm’s market knowledge boundaries are defined by the types of customers or 
customer needs it understands (e.g. as indicated by its participation in different product markets 
or market segments).  A firm’s market production boundaries are defined by its experience with 
the activities used to deliver manufactured products.  We distinguish firms that have broad 
market production boundaries because they have integrated into marketing and distribution 
activities from those with narrow boundaries in this respect, and measure market knowledge 
boundary breadth as the number of product markets in which a firm has participated. 
Our study builds on Kapoor and Adner (2012) and differs in several important ways. 
While Kapoor and Adner focus on technological boundaries sustaining product innovation, we 
study the influence of firm boundaries on survival in a context that was frequently punctuated by 
systemic change and in which systemic changes often brought about a disruption to the 
established market systems.  Specifically, several systemic changes led to product offerings that 
included new features but did not initially meet the performance criteria established by previous 
technology and required by the then dominant customers, but which ultimately dominated the 
largest markets for the technology. Accordingly, we also focus on how firms’ market boundaries 
affected their survival prospects.  An interesting feature of our context is that there were frequent 
shifts between open and closed standards.  As new component technologies were introduced, 
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they disrupted established technological systems and firms developed proprietary product 
architectures to incorporate them. However, through reverse engineering and other forms of 
vicarious learning, the new component technologies eventually diffused, suppliers of the new 
components emerged, and the industry settled back into a more open architecture.  Periods of 
stability and the advantages from designing and developing and particular technology were short 
lived, though. With frequent systemic change, firms need the capability to adapt their 
technological and market systems in unanticipated ways, yet existing literature provides limited 
insight into how a firm’s knowledge and production boundaries can best position them for this 
kind of turbulence.   
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2.0  HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY KNOWLEDGE AND PRODUCTION BOUNDARIES 
 
As outlined above, systemic change disrupts a firm’s technological and market systems, creating 
new markets and requiring new combinations of technical knowledge and skills to respond to 
customer requirements (Christensen, 1993; Henderson, 1990).  We expect broad technology 
knowledge boundaries to increase a firm’s likelihood to survive such systemic technological 
changes for two reasons.  First, experience in multiple technology domains broadens a firm’s 
absorptive capacity, increasing the likelihood that at least some of what it knows will help it to 
understand a new component technology and anticipate how to adapt other components to 
leverage its advantages (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Firms with broad technological knowledge 
can recombine existing component knowledge in new ways to accommodate systemic 
disruptions to the technological system (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Fleming, Mingo, and Chen, 
2007). Second, broad technology knowledge boundaries, attained through experimentation with 
many different components and their interactions (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2002; 
Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008; Zander, 1995), also provide a firm with coupling knowledge.  This 
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enables a firm to know which components can be combined and how they will interact and 
perform at different parameter values (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2002; Yayavaram, 2008; 
Zander and Kogut, 1995), which, in turn, can increase the speed with which the firm can 
incorporate new components into a device (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Takeishi, 2002).   
Thus, firms that have broader technology knowledge boundaries may be better equipped 
to adapt to a systemic technological change as they are better able to predict the effects of a new 
component on the overall device, and to incorporate the new technology more quickly. Firms 
with broad technology knowledge boundaries have greater insight into different potential 
couplings of new component technologies that, in turn, should increase their likelihood of 
survival through a systemic change.  In line with these arguments, we propose: 
H1: Technology knowledge breadth will delay a firm’s exit from a market. 
In addition to requiring new combinations of technological knowledge and skills, 
systemic change may also shift manufacturing processes and specifications. The systemic change 
may require new materials to be used and factories to change processes to incorporate the 
technological change within the component.  Firms that integrated their manufacturing, and thus 
have broad technology production boundaries, might be able to respond more quickly to 
systemic change by working through the experimentation needed to assimilate a new component 
technology and adapt multiple component interfaces internally. A firm that controls the 
production of several component technologies and the multiple associated manufacturing 
technologies is more likely to move down the learning curve faster than an individual component 
supplier when system level knowledge is required to create a new product (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Kapoor and Adner, 2011; Negro and Sorenson, 2006; Sorenson, 2003). Contracts tend to 
be incomplete when the parameters of the technology cannot yet be specified to the supplier and 
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the product architecture is unstable. Firms that are integrated into manufacturing would not be 
subject to potentially overpriced components from external suppliers or be forced to compete 
with other firms for supplier contracts, which could further slow adaptation (Arrow, 1975).    
If the supplier of a component does not envision the same value from the new 
technology, it will be more difficult to work through the performance trade-offs and adjustments 
to the existing technological system.  Both the focal firm and its suppliers may have trouble 
predicting design parameters that will maximize the device’s performance.  In such an uncertain 
situation, external suppliers could choose not to supply the new technology, or they could adopt 
an alternative technology that is not compatible with the focal firm’s product design and 
performance goals (Negro and Sorenson, 2006; Sorenson, 2003), making it difficult to meet the 
customer needs and requirements of the emerging market.  In contrast, firms that integrated into 
manufacturing have better control over the quality and specifications of their internal supplies as 
they choose the materials, the manufacturing processes, and the parameters.  
In sum, firms that have broad technology production boundaries are better able to engage 
in the experimentation needed to adapt to systemic change and are able to respond quickly. A 
quicker response to a systemic change to a firm’s technological system allows a firm to 
capitalize on new market opportunities and avoid ceding market share to new entrants 
(Christensen, 1993). We therefore propose: 
H2: Broad technology production boundaries will delay a firm’s exit from a market. 
Beyond these main effects, we also argue that technology knowledge and production 
boundary breadth further interact with each other in their influence on firm survival during 
systemic changes.  The reason for this interactive effect is that it may be difficult for either the 
R&D or the manufacturing function unilaterally to predict component interactions and to solve 
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device performance issues. The firm would have difficulty forecasting changes in parameters, 
manufacturing processes, and materials to suppliers that must take time to learn the new 
technology. If the product must be brought to market quickly, and interactions with new 
components are unknown and systemically affect device performance, firms must have a close 
working relationship between R&D and manufacturing, to enable collaborative problem solving 
(Hoetker, 2005) and a faster time to market.  Firms that have both manufacturing and broad 
R&D within their firm boundaries would be better able to communicate information between 
these groups and jointly solve problems after a systemic change (Balachandra, 2002; Hoetker, 
2005), thereby increasing the likelihood of quickly incorporating technological changes into 
products. Formally: 
H3: Firms with broad technology production boundaries and broad technology knowledge 
boundaries will exit more slowly than firms that have narrow technology production boundaries 
and/or narrow technology knowledge boundaries. 
 
 
2.2 MARKET KNOWLEDGE AND PRODUCTION BOUNDARIES 
 
Systemic change can create new market opportunities for commercialization, with new customer 
bases and corresponding needs/requirements but to exploit these opportunities a firm might need 
to adapt its market system, or how it commercializes technology and profits from it. These new 
market opportunities generally begin as small niche markets that do not seem viable to large 
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incumbents, and they may be particularly difficult for incumbents with narrow market 
boundaries to recognize or appraise (Christensen, 1993).  
Firms with broad market knowledge boundaries come to understand a wide range of 
customer needs and preferences and how to satisfy them and thus may be capable of acting 
quickly to exploit new market niches created by systemic change (Chesbrough, 2003; Zhou and 
Li, 2012). One method of achieving broad market knowledge boundaries is a firm’s exposure to 
different markets through diverse product offerings.  Previous studies have found that product 
diversification enhanced firm performance (e.g. Tallman and Li, 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998) and have theorized that product diversity gives firms a richer knowledge base through 
exposure to new ideas and routines that, in turn, increase the firms’ technological capabilities 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Miller & Chen, 1994, 1996). Participating in multiple product 
markets helps firms to understand a wide variety of the applications customers are using products 
for, and to better anticipate emerging market opportunities and capitalize on them.  Broad market 
experience provides analogues that can be used to anticipate the growth trajectory for new 
markets (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005).   
By contrast, a firm with narrow product offerings can suffer from cognitive inertia, which 
can keep it focused on its existing customer base, and prevent it from creating new products and 
finding new markets for commercializing new innovations (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  A firm 
with diverse product offerings is better able to overcome organizational inertia that focuses a 
firm’s attention on current markets and customers, allowing it to seek out new market 
opportunities for new technology commercialization (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Zhou and Li, 
2012), created by systemic change. In addition, as they seek and seize new market opportunities 
for their inventions, firms with broad market knowledge generate more unique recombinations of 
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knowledge to draw upon (Ahuja and Katila, 2001) and thereby more flexible routines (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003; Sorenson, Cohen, Roy, and Ren, 2006) that can be adjusted to cope with 
change.   
As a result, firms that have more experience competing in different markets are more 
likely to survive a systemic change, since it gives the firm greater knowledge breadth and 
reduces a firm’s myopia regarding existing market segments. Firms with broad market 
knowledge boundaries are better able to identify and accurately evaluate a new market’s 
potential. In line with these arguments, we therefore propose: 
H4: Market knowledge breadth will delay a firm’s exit from a market. 
Firms that come into the industry with a particular technology will gain knowledge about 
the corresponding customer base and performance requirements for that technology through 
investments in downstream assets, such as a marketing and sales department and different 
distribution channels. Firms that invest in more of these activities have broader market 
production boundaries (Christensen, 1993, 1997).  When systemic change creates new markets, 
these may require new distribution channels and sales and marketing approaches.  A firm’s 
existing market production boundaries, it way of marketing and distributing its technology 
products for profit, can make adapting to new downstream activities challenging.  
Before a systemic change, when technologies and markets are relatively stable, a firm 
that has invested in downstream assets (i.e. marketing teams, distribution channels, sales 
networks, etc.) is more likely to survive (Rothaermel, 2001, 2005; Tripsas, 1997) because the 
enhanced customer knowledge from their broad market production boundary likely leads to 
increased cash flow from its current customers.  If a systemic change creates new markets for 
which those downstream assets and capabilities are no longer relevant, the firm is unlikely to 
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receive correct information from current customers about the size and potential of the new 
market as well as the new customers’ needs, (Harrigan, 1985; Christensen, 1993). Firms with 
market-specific downstream assets have information filters that are focused on existing 
customers’ feedback, but may not be able to see a new customer base and understand its different 
needs and performance requirements. 
Complementary downstream assets also raise the adjustment costs firms incur to 
transition away from their initial markets and from performance metrics valuable to customers in 
those markets because resources have already been committed to serve the old customer base.  In 
other words, the firm is “locked in” by investments in customer data and distribution channels 
for the old customer base, which are no longer relevant for the new market.  Saddled with higher 
adjustment costs, any new market must be large enough to justify the additional expense of the 
new complementary assets necessary to succeed in the new market and the potential desertion of 
the old complementary assets.  Most new markets start off very small, however, which does not 
justify the adjustment cost for firms to move away from their old customers and target a new 
market segment, thereby making them less likely to adapt to a systemic change (Christensen, 
1993, 1997, 1998).  We therefore propose: 
H5: Broad market production boundaries will accelerate a firm’s exit from a market. 
Although broad market production boundaries (i.e. being heavily vertically integrated 
downstream from manufacturing, for each market that a firm participates in) can slow adaptation 
to systemic change, the effects may be attenuated somewhat if the firm also participates in many 
different product markets, providing it with broad market knowledge boundaries.  Firms with 
broad market knowledge boundaries may be aware of new technology and emerging markets 
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(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Zhou and Li, 2012), increasing the chances that it recognizes the new 
market and can appropriately appraise its potential value. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H6: Firms with broad market production and broad market knowledge boundaries will exit more 
slowly than firms with broad market production and narrow market knowledge boundaries and 
firms with narrow market production boundaries.    
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3.0  METHODS 
3.1 INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
 
The context for our study is the hard disk drive (HDD) industry, which we follow from 1975 
through 1999. Prior research on this industry has generally concluded prior to 1999 since the 
Hard Disk Drive Trend Report, a major source of company and product data ends at this point 
(Barnett, 2004; Hoetker, 2007).  This industry provides an ideal setting in which to evaluate the 
effects of firms’ knowledge and production boundary breadth on their survival through change, 
for several reasons. First, from its genesis, the industry has experienced multiple systemic 
technological changes within a short time period (Christensen, 1993, 1997) (see Figure 2 for a 
chronology of the different changes that occurred in the industry during the period of study). 
Second, products were complex, consisting of multiple components that each progressed at 
different rates technologically (Christensen 1993, 1997).  This type of technology is 
characterized by frequent systemic change because, in order to derive maximum benefit from 
substantive component innovations, firms need to alter other components and the architecture 
which links them (Rosenberg, 1976).  Third, with each wave of systemic technological change 
the adaptive benefits of firm’s boundary choices were tested, as product designs required 
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modification and the technological standards governing how components could interface 
fluctuated between closed, proprietary and open standards. 
 
Figure 2. Chronology of Technological and Market Changes in the HDD Industry: 1977-2009 
 
3.1.1 Manufacturing/Production of Disk Drives 
IBM introduced the Winchester drive in 1973, a sealed HDD drive (Christensen 1993). Disk 
drives contained magnetically coated disks where data could be recorded, a head that read the 
data, and actuator that moved the head to the correct location on the disk and an interface with 
the computer. All components were enclosed in a sealed casing (Lerner, 1997). The first 
commercial drives were 14” in size and sold in mainframe computers or directly to computer 
users (Barnett 2004). 
There are two major components in disk manufacturing: the read-write head and the disk. 
To manufacture disk media, both sides of a platter are coated with different materials. Different 
coatings have been used as technology improved (e.g. a change from iron oxide to thin-film), 
which enabled disks to hold more data in less space, be more durable, and be more reliable. The 
finish must be smooth without the imperfections that can cause the read/write head to crash, 
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decreasing reliability and storage capacity. The original process for head manufacturing was 
winding copper wire around a ferrite core, but as technology progressed and materials (and their 
physical properties) changed, head manufacturing was modified. HDD manufacturers had to 
continuously invest in new capital equipment because of frequent technological changes. The 
HDD market was a cost competitive market, which required the HDD manufacturers to run 
large, global manufacturing operations to meet low price demands (Kumar, 2003). One of our 
interviewees stated that firms that did their own manufacturing could ensure a cleaner facility, 
would affect long-term reliability of their disk drives, a key driver of customer satisfaction 
(Interview 1, 1-18-13). 
3.1.2 Firm Typology 
Three different types of competitors were prevalent in the HDD industry: established firms, 
entrepreneurial start-ups and diversified firms. Fourteen firms were considered established firms 
in the industry (e.g. IBM, Burroughs, and Digital Equipment Corp, among others). These firms 
included computer manufacturers that made their own drives for their computer products. These 
firms tended to be vertically integrated as they had to produce all of the components necessary 
for the drives before component suppliers came into existence in the late 70s/early 80s. Another 
103 firms were entrepreneurial startups (e.g. Seagate, Conner Peripherals, and Rodime, among 
others).  Start-ups in this industry were usually backed by venture capital financing and focused 
only on the hard disk drive industry.  These firms were usually involved in both the design and 
manufacture of hard disk drives.  These firms did not make computers, but instead sold their 
drives to end-users (the PCM market) and to computer manufacturers (the OEM market). These 
firms rose to prominence as components became available from independent supplier firms. 
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Start-ups tended to enter the hard disk drive industry by using older generations of the 
component technologies, once they had been reverse engineered, or were being phased out by the 
technology leaders, and open standards for the technologies’ interface with the rest of the drive 
had been established. Startups did not initially need to be vertically integrated, as they could 
obtain heads and media from suppliers, assemble the components, and sell the completed drive in 
the OEM market (Christensen, 1993).  
 Fifty-six firms were diversified firms (e.g. 3M, BASF, and Samsung, among others). 
These firms were involved in multiple industries, with disk drives as one of their product lines. 
These firms expanded into the hard disk drive industry to gain new market share, and in some 
cases adapted technology used in other markets for use in disk drive production (Christensen, 
1993). 
The industry became more global as it matured. Japanese firms entered the market seven 
years after the US (US firms: 126, Japanese firms: 36), Europe (27 firms) 12 years after, 
followed by Brazilian (10 firms), Taiwanese (4 firms), and Korean firms (6 firms) in the early to 
mid 1980s. As the market first emerged, most countries’ HDD markets were domestic, with 
domestic computer manufacturers purchasing HDD from domestic HDD manufacturers, but 
firms soon began to market their drives globally (Barnett 2004). 
3.1.3 Market Typology 
There were three different markets for disk drives: Captive, PCM and OEM. Some firms 
competed in multiple markets at once, while others concentrated on a single market. Some firms 
(e.g. Data General, Digital Equipment Corporation, Hewlett-Packard and IBM, Control Data, 
and Hitachi, among others) manufactured “captive” disk drives for their own computer products. 
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Other firms, such as Century Data, Wangco, and Kennedy sold drives directly to computer users 
who needed additional data storage for their IBM computers. This PCM market thrived by 
imitating IBM’s technology and offering less expensive storage than IBM (Christensen, 1992). 
In the mid-1970s, the minicomputer market developed, and hard disk drives were now sold 
directly to computer manufacturers and the OEM market emerged (Filson, 2004). Firms such as 
Memorex, Perkin-Elmer, and Storage Technology sold drives directly to computer 
manufacturers. The computer manufacturers frequently needed more drives in addition to their 
captive drives to keep up with demand for their computer products. But some computer 
manufacturers did not make their own captive drives and purchased them from other firms in the 
OEM market (Christensen, 1992). 
3.1.4 Typology of Technological Changes in the Industry 
Form factor changes were reductions to the size of the disk drive. Their smaller size meant the 
drives could be used with different types of computer products (e.g. desktops, laptops, 
notebooks, and handheld devices, among others) that appealed to different end users. Each new 
form factor initially attracted a small customer base with different needs than customers for the 
previous form factor. The early-adopting customers for the new form factors were willing to 
accept decreased reliability, speed and storage capacity in exchange for drive availability and 
lower prices. The technological leap to a new form factor was not large, since much of the same 
technological expertise was still relevant. Smaller drives meant that components had to shrink 
and sometimes be redesigned, which had unpredictable implications for the interfaces between 
components (Barnett, 2004). But the real challenge was for established firms to recognize the 
viability of the new market segment. Many established firms relied on their larger, older 
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customers and did not recognize the opportunity in these new markets as lucrative, and were 
slow to bring the smaller drives to market. Profit margins were much smaller for the new form 
factors than for their older generation products. As one of our interviewees stated, reliability was 
“king” for established firms, because older products (like mainframes) that failed meant millions 
of dollars of damage (Interview 3, 1-25-13). It was difficult for established firms like IBM to 
offer products that did not meet their very low tolerances for failure and products developed for 
new markets tended to be less reliable, at least initially.  New entrants (start-ups and diversified) 
focused on creating new form factors, and finding new markets (such as laptop computers) to sell 
them to. By the time the established firms recognized the importance of a new market and 
introduced a new product in that form factor to compete, the new entrants already had 
established economies of scale and the established firms could never regain market share from 
them (Christensen, 1993). Figure 3 presents a list of form factor introduction dates, along with 
the first firms to introduce each drive to the market. 
 
 
Source: Disk/Trend Report 
Figure 3. Form Factor/Architecture Introduction Dates 
  
In addition to smaller diameter drives to serve new markets, firms also had to innovate in more 
expensive component technology that improved areal density, speed/access time and reliability 
(Lerner, 1997). Component changes, such as those precipitated by the use of different materials, 
often required new manufacturing processes for the read/write head and the disk media and 
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might also require changes to the electronics and other components.  However, they tended not 
to drive changes in the market applications of hard disk drives, in the same way that form factor 
changes did. Component changes often took years of very expensive R&D, progressed at 
different rates, and created interaction problems with other components within the device, which 
caused device performance to suffer unless a firm knew what parameters to adjust and how to 
interface components together. These changes, most notably the magneto-resistive (MR) head, 
required multiple departments (R&D, product development, manufacturing, etc.) to work 
together to get the device to work with the new component (Interview 2, 1-23-13; Interview 3, 1-
25-13) 
It was also not always clear which technology would become dominant. Some firms 
made the wrong bets on technology and had to exit.  For example, Ampex tried to commercialize 
the Alar film disk, but the disk was not mechanically robust or durable, which caused a high 
failure rate. Other firms waited too long to introduce new technology and were forced to exit. For 
example, Applied Magnetics waited too long to invest in thin film heads and then MR head 
technology and was forced to exit (Interview 1, 1-18-13).  
Because of the frequent technological changes, slim margins, and short product life 
cycles, firms could not afford to miss two product cycles – doing so meant the firm would almost 
certainly have to exit the industry (Interview 1, 1-18-13). Thus, there was an incentive for rapid 
innovation because of quickly decreasing profitability over the short product life cycle (6-9 
months). Most firms had trouble keeping up with the increases in storage capacity and the 
reduction in physical size of the drive (Barnett, 2004). Figure 4 lists important component 
change introduction dates, as well as the firms that first introduced the new components in their 
HDD products. 
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Source: Disk/Trend Report 
Figure 4. Component Change Introduction Dates 
 
3.1.5 Vertical Integration into Technology Production in the HDD Industry 
Vertical integration into production (manufacturing components) was capital intensive, and did 
not seem necessary to firms that had access to components from suppliers and could use these 
outsourced components to assemble their own drives (Christensen, 1993). This arrangement 
worked well when the technology was stable and the interface between components was known 
(open standards were established during periods of stability as firms learned the interface 
between a set of components). However, when technological change occurred, many suppliers 
ceased operation because they could not integrate the new technologies into their component 
products quickly enough (Interview 1, 1-18-13; Interview 2, 1-23-13). This put non-vertically 
integrated firms at a disadvantage, as they no longer had a supply of components that could be 
incorporated into the drives. Systemic technological change also created system integration 
problems for the non-integrated firm. Interactions between components changed (so standards 
were no longer open or known during periods of instability), so it became more difficult for 
firms to integrate new components into the device without having process (non-patented) 
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knowledge about their properties and how each component interfaced with the others. Since 
there were frequent technological changes of this type within the industry and product life cycles 
were so short (6-9 months), firms needed to be able to manufacture and incorporate the 
component innovations into the device quickly, or they would lose market share on a product 
generation (according to our interviewees, two misses were fatal to a firm). These firms either 
had to vertically integrate, or exit the industry (Interview 1, 1-18-13).  
Figures 5 and 6 visually represent the ramifications of boundary choices for systemic 
change in the HDD industry. Figure 5 presents the different boundary choices a firm had for 
drives, head and media components and drive assembly in a stable environment. In a stable 
environment, standards for components (e.g. materials, specifications and parameters for 
interface with other components within the device) were open and known by the firms in the 
industry. Thus, firms could make their own components, but also had the ability to buy 
components from suppliers since interactions/product architecture standards were open and 
known, and assembly did not require much system integration knowledge. Figure 6 presents the 
different boundary choices a firm had for drives, component supply and assembly after a 
systemic change. After a systemic change, standards for components were closed and not known 
by all the firms in the industry. Firms did not know how a new component material, for example, 
would affect the other components within the device, and did not know the specifications needed 
to maximize the drive’s performance. In this situation, as represented by the Xs, firms had to 
make their own components, as suppliers were not able to stay in business when technological 
uncertainty increased and interactions/product architecture was unknown (Interview 2, 1-23-13). 
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Sources: Interviews 1, 2, and 3, Christensen (1993) and McKendrick (2000) 
Figure 5.  An HDD Firm’s Vertical Boundary Choices in a Stable Environment 
 
 
Sources: Interviews 1, 2, and 3, Christensen (1993) and McKendrick (2000) 
Figure 6.  An HDD Firm’s Reduced Vertical Boundary Choices after Systemic Change 
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3.1.6 Vertical Integration into Market Production in the HDD Industry 
Firms could choose to distribute their drives using internal marketing departments, or they could 
distribute their drives through an intermediary (as Hitachi did in Europe, partnering with BASF 
and Siemens) (data from Disk Trend Report). The large firms (e.g. IBM) had their own sales, 
marketing, and distribution staffs, but these staffs were geared towards large customers they 
could serve with proven technology with high margins (e.g. IBM’s enterprise system business). 
The smaller firms picked up smaller volume contracts by using older technology, but not from 
large firms like IBM that were disinclined to sell their component technology in the OEM market 
or license it to other firms (Interview 3, 1-25-13). Many of the smaller firms did not have 
budgets that could support a marketing team, and relied on personal contacts within the industry 
for smaller scale customers that larger firms did not pay attention to because the sales contract 
volume was too small (Interview 3, 1-25-13). Many of the executives who worked in HDD from 
the beginning of the industry moved to different startups (see Christensen, 1993, who traces 
founders who moved amongst startups over the years), bringing their customers with them.  
3.2 SOURCES 
 
We constructed our dataset from four main sources: the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) patent database and the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent databases for 
patent information; the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC) for alliance and M&A data; 
and the Hard Disk Drive Trend Report, an annual publication by Jim Porter from 1976-1999, that 
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we used as a source for categorizing firms into strategic groups and for introduction dates for 
each of the firm’s technologies, as well as for market share information, entry, exit, and founding 
dates, product diversity, competitors, industry market data, and marketing and technology 
production activities for each firm annually. We have also compiled company histories by year 
for each of the 228 firms in the industry using 1976-1999 from the Hard Disk Drive Trend 
Report, using SDC to corroborate information about firms’ activities.  
To trace each firm accurately over our 20 year time period, we consolidated companies 
and their resources based on the M&A data from SDC and Disk Trend Report and name changes 
from Disk Trend Report’s manufacturer profiles. Over the time period, multiple firms merged 
assets (including knowledge resources such as patents), so we consequently had to account for 
this in the data. When a firm changed names, the two firms were consolidated in the data. If a 
firm purchased assets of another firm from a bankruptcy, we did not consolidate, because there 
was no way to know what specific resources were obtained through the asset sale.  Finally, when 
firms merged or one firm acquired another, the assets of the two firms were consolidated 
together, to account for the knowledge resources accumulated by the M&A. 
Finding data on firm’s activities was challenging, as most of the firms within the 
population (120 firms, 72% of the population) were private, and had an average lifespan of 4.5 
years. In addition, most of the public firms (e.g. BASF, Siemens, 3M, etc.) were large, 
diversified firms and did not have information available on the specific divisions that competed 
in HDD. Daily and Dollinger (1993) as well as Durand and Vargas (2003) have noted the 
challenges involved with obtaining data on the activities of small private firms. We had to rely 
on what was in Disk Trend Report, McKendrick (2000), other papers on HDD history (e.g. 
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Christensen, 1993; Barnett, 2004), and the expertise of our interviewees for the information we 
coded (similar to Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009).  
In particular, as there was no direct source that listed a firm’s knowledge or production 
activities within the industry, we relied on coding qualitative data from within the company 
histories for each firm, each year. Each company history chronicles each firm’s experience in the 
industry to 1999 (or up to its exit is it occurred prior to 1999) and consists of two single-spaced 
pages on average.  
We used the company histories and data from Disk Trend Report to code each of the 
variables we hypothesized would affect survival.  Technological production boundaries were 
coded as 1 for broad and 0 for narrow based on qualitative evidence of manufacturing of 
components within the company histories (e.g. an excerpt from Disk Trend Report: “Disks will 
be internally produced using a hybrid plated/sputtering process, and a new production facility is 
planned for Austin, Texas”). The breadth of technological knowledge was measured using patent 
data from NBER and USPTO. However, many firms in the industry do not patent, so we also 
coded whether firms engaged in R&D activities using qualitative evidence provided in the 
company histories (e.g. an excerpt from Disk Trend Report: “Samsung maintains an R&D center 
for disk drive design in San Jose, California.”). Broad (versus narrow) market production 
boundaries were similarly coded for firms based on qualitative evidence of marketing sales, and 
distribution activities within the company histories (e.g. an excerpt from Disk Trend Report: 
“ISS also has an OEM marketing program, carried out with moderate success to date, but which 
will probably grow.”). Breadth of market knowledge was measured as a count of the different 
product groups each firm offered products in, each year. See Table 1 below for examples of how 
we used the qualitative data to code these variables: 
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 Table 1. Examples of Qualitative Data Coded for Main Effects 
Boundary Source 1 Source 2 
Market production “The least vertically integrated is 
Quantum, which for the most part 
handles only design and 
marketing, leaving all assembly 
to its Japanese partner MKE.” 
(source: McKendrick, 2000) 
“In 1991, Quantum further 
strengthened its efforts to 
increase sales through 
distribution, folding Plus 
Development and its industrial 
distribution activities into a 
business unit named Quantum 
Commercial Products. Quantum 
also operated a direct marketing 
subsidiary, LaCie Ltd., which has 
been attached to the new business 
unit. About 30% of Quantum’s 
revenue comes from distribution. 
(source: Disk Trend Report, 
1991) 
Technology knowledge “Samsung maintains an R&D 
center for disk drive design in 
San Jose, California.” (source: 
Disk Trend Report, 1991) 
“Samsung has R&D facilities in 
South Korea and California.” 
(source: McKendrick, 2000) 
Technology production “The company has an extensive 
geographic reach. Its operations 
outside the US include 
manufacturing facilities in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand as well as sales offices 
throughout the Americas, Asia 
Pacific, Europe and the Middle 
East.” (source- Western Digital 
SWOT analysis on Business 
Source Complete) 
“Western Digital had 
manufacturing operations in 
Singapore as of 1988.” (source- 
McKendrick, 2000) 
 
The interviews (see Appendix A) enabled us to fill in gaps in the data we needed to 
construct the main independent variables described below, and it was helpful in interpreting what 
the measures could capture as well as the patterns we observed.  The former CTO of one of the 
surviving firms provided contacts and introductions to key managers at firms in the industry.   In 
particular, these interviews provided insight into the kinds of technological changes that the 
HDD industry experienced, which required systemic change to a firm’s technology and/or 
market systems, and how firms dealt with systemic technological change.   
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3.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The primary dependent variable for our hypotheses is firm survival.  We used a binary indicator 
of whether a firm survived during the period of study. We defined a firm as having exited when a 
firm no longer shipped products in the HDD industry, either because of bankruptcy (48 firms), 
M&A (42 firms, that after the M&A, were no longer making HDD products), or divestment (81 
firms out of the industry) (Lexis Nexus, Disk Trend Report). 
3.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We measured the breadth of technology knowledge boundaries with a continuous variable to 
indicate how many subclasses a firm patented in within the HDD industry (please see Appendix 
B for some examples of the subclasses used to define HDD and how they map onto specific 
components). We used the NBER/USPTO patent databases to obtain data on patent activity for 
each firm: which HDD firms patented and patent dates for 3 main classes: 360, 369, 428 (similar 
to Audia and Goncalo, 2007).  Since our interviewees indicated that firms may have done R&D 
but may not have patented (either because they did not want their competitors to know what they 
were working on or because firms did not patent process technologies which are harder to protect 
with patents), we used information obtained through company histories and through interviews 
with industry experts to code a binary variable for firms that had been doing R&D (84 firms, 
51% of sample) (Interview 1, 1-18-13; Interview 2, 1-23-13; Interview 3, 1-25-13). We added 
this to the continuous variable that counted patent subclasses for each firm in order to account for 
the process knowledge the firms could obtain through R&D. 
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We measured whether a firm’s knowledge production boundaries are broad or narrow 
with a dichotomous variable of 1 or 0 indicating whether the firm manufactured major 
components (1, broad) or not (0, narrow). To obtain data on what manufacturing activities each 
firm performs each year, we used the company histories we compiled from the Hard Disk Drive 
Trend Report as well as McKendrick’s (2000) lists of component manufacturers. An example of 
data found for a firm who manufactured components, from Disk Trend Report: “Cybernex, the 
previous thin film head manufacturer, evolved into Century Data, Inc., combining the operations 
of Century Data Systems, Cybernex Advanced Storage Technology (CAST), Amcodyne, 
Tecstor, and Ford-Higgins, a subsystem producer.” When these data did not clearly indicate 
whether a particular firm manufactured its own components, we relied on our interviewees for 
guidance on which firms had manufactured and which firms had outsourced, and corroborated 
their information with Christensen (1993). The interviewees stated that the firms with the largest 
market share were the firms that were vertically integrated into manufacturing activities (with the 
exception of Seagate and Western Digital, that vertically integrated into manufacturing activities 
later. Seagate vertically integrated into manufacturing with the acquisition of the Imprimis 
division of Control Data in October, 1989 (verified by interviewees, SDC, and Disk Trend 
Report). Western Digital vertically integrated into manufacturing in 1995 with a factory in 
Singapore. Thus, we used the market share data from Disk Trend Report to code additional 
manufacturing data (125 firms, 76% of the sample, had data for at least one firm year, while 40 
firms, 24% of the sample, had no data for any firm years). If data did not clearly indicate whether 
a firm manufactured components, and the firm was not listed in the top 20 rankings for firm 
market share (US or global) for that year, we used “0” to indicate that the firm did not do its own 
manufacturing. If data did not clearly indicate whether a firm manufactured components, and the 
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firm was listed in the top 20 rankings for firm market share (US or global) for that year, we used 
“1” to indicate that the firm did its own manufacturing. 
To measure a firm’s market production boundaries, we used a dichotomous variable of 1 
or 0 to indicate whether a firm directly sold, marketed, or distributed its products. This marketing 
data was obtained from the company histories we compiled from Disk Trend Report. When these 
data did not clearly indicate whether a particular firm marketed or distributed its own products, 
we relied on our interviews (see Appendix A) for guidance on which firms had done their own 
marketing and which firms had outsourced. Drawing from the interview notes (Interview 3, 1-
25-13) and Christensen, 1993, the established firms were the firms that were vertically integrated 
into marketing activities, while startups lacked the capital to have large marketing teams, and 
looked to personal connections with computer companies to obtain business. We categorized 
each firm as a startup (103 firms in the sample), established computer firm (14 firms in the 
sample), or a subsidiary of a diversified firm (56 firms in the sample). To categorize a firm as an 
established firm, we used Christensen’s lists of computer manufacturers that made their own 
drives, and a top 10 original industry disk drive manufacturer list by market share (Christensen, 
1993). Although the market share list fluctuates over time, the purpose of this list is to show the 
established firms at the beginning of the study.  The 18 firms listed in Figure 7 are the 
established firms in our sample. 
 40 
  Figure 7. Lists of Established Firms at Beginning of Study, 1976 
 
To distinguish between a subsidiary of a diversified firm and an entrepreneurial startup, 
we used company histories to determine when firms were founded and what industries they were 
involved in. If a firm was involved in multiple industries, we labeled it a diversified firm, but if 
the firm was only in the HDD industry at its founding, we labeled the firm a startup. 
If data did not clearly indicate whether a firm marketed or distributed its own products 
(70 firms, 42% of sample had data for at least one firm year, while 95 firms, 58% of the sample 
had no data for any firm years), and the firm was an established firm, we used “1” to indicate 
that the firm did its own marketing, if the firm was categorized as a “startup” firm, we used “0” 
to indicate that the firm did not do its own marketing, if the firm was categorized as a diversified 
firm’s marketing activities, we coded the data as missing (based on prior literature and our 
interviews, there was no basis to label diversified firms as integrated or not). 
To measure the breadth of a firm’s market knowledge boundaries, we created a variable 
to account for the diversity of products each firm offered. This measure shows the diversity of 
products a firm offered in the HDD industry (and thus the number of product markets the firm 
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was exposed to within the HDD industry).  We counted the number of product groups each firm 
competed in annually (from the Hard Disk Drive Trend Report), similar to Carroll (2004). 
3.5 CONTROLS 
Competitor density: In the population ecology literature, competitor density has been shown to 
have a non-monotonic effect on firm survival (e.g. Hannan, 1989). To control for the effects of 
competitor density, we calculated the number of competitors for each firm for each year by 
product group and divided the number of competitors by the number of product groups each firm 
was competing in, using data from the Hard Disk Drive Trend Report in a similar manner to 
Carroll (2004). 
Market size of industry: To control for macroeconomic effects that may have affected the 
industry due to its changing size and the influx of new entrants as new computer product markets 
became lucrative (see Christensen, 1993), we used Disk Trend Report to obtain the total dollar 
value of shipments in the industry for each year of study (in millions). 
Market size by competitive group3: Shipments in the annual Disk Trend Report were 
grouped according to storage capacity and type of drive. If a firm was competing in fewer 
product groups or categories that were no longer financially rewarding, a firm may be more 
likely to fail. We used Disk Trend Report to obtain the dollar value of shipments in each 
competitive group for each year of study (in millions) in order to control for the amount of 
industry dollars each firm was directly competing for, which shifted by year.   
3 We used the squared value of this continuous variable in all of our survival models for better model fit. 
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Era dummy: Our interviewees stated that the biggest technological adaptive challenge 
occurred in 1991, when IBM introduced the magneto-resistive head (Interview 1, 1-18-13; 
Interview 2, 1-23-13; Interview 3, 1-25-13). We wanted to control for this specific change, as our 
interviewees stated that it was one of the most difficult to incorporate, required multiple 
departments to work together to solve interface/performance issues, and subsequently caused 
many firms to fail. We used a dichotomous variable with a value of 0 before the change took 
place in 1991, and 1 after the change occurred. 
We tried to control for other firm characteristics such as size and age, to better distinguish 
the boundary effects that we predict from the firm characteristics we used to infer and assign the 
production boundary measures.  The controls we tested included the alliance count per firm per 
year (as a proxy for firm size) and firm age at entry.  We found that the models were robust to 
these additional controls, but the model fit and stability was better without them.   
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4.0  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We test our hypotheses with survival analyses, with the hazard rate defined as the probability 
that a firm exits the market in a moment t given that it has survived until this period and 
conditional on a vector of xit, which may both include both time-varying and time-constant 
variables, where T is a non-negative random variable (duration), which we assume continuous, 
so that λ(t) is an instantaneous rate of exit (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980): 
  
 
 
We used the Accelerated Failure Time (“AFT”) model to predict firm survival because results, 
reported as factors that will either accelerate or decelerate a firm’s exit, are more intuitive and 
easier to interpret. The acceleration factors calculated by the AFT model allow us to evaluate the 
effect of each predictor variables on the survival time. Coefficients that are less than one indicate 
that the variable decelerates exit while coefficients estimated to be greater than one indicate the 
variable accelerates exit.  Survival times follow a parametric lognormal distribution. (Collett, 
2003; Dätwyler and Stucki, 2011; Swindell, 2009): 
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We ran the models with robust error variances, which account for lack of independence between 
observations from the same firm (the Huber-White sandwich estimator of error variances). Table 
2 reports basic statistics for each of the main effects and controls, while the correlation table in 
Table 3 reports the correlations for the main effects and controls. 
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Table 2. Basic Statistics 
Variable* Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Breadth of technological 
knowledge4 4.319843 13.78161 0 167 
Broad technological 
production .5626632 .4963819 0 1 
Breadth of market 
knowledge 1.804707 3.149766 0 9 
Broad market production .5678851 .4956938 0 1 
Average number of 
competitors 6.08895 11.71315 0 50 
Industry size 14158.34 8245.945 2813.4 31736 
Era dummy .1501305 .3574327 0 1 
Market size by 
competitive group 5279.375 6914.752 0 31162.2 
Broad tech knowledge, 
Broad tech production 
(Matrix 1) .4804178 .4999428 0 1 
Broad tech knowledge, 
Narrow tech production 
(Matrix 1) .1292428 .3356877 0 1 
Narrow tech knowledge, 
Broad tech production 
(Matrix 1) .0822454 .2749178 0 1 
Broad market knowledge, 
Broad market production 
(Matrix 2) .4921671 .5002653 0 1 
Broad market knowledge, 
Narrow market 
production (Matrix 2) .2898172 .4539738 0 1 
Narrow market 
knowledge, Broad  
market production 
(Matrix 2) .2362924 .4250814 0 1 
*The number of observations for each variable was 766. 
  
4 The maximum value of 167 is an outlier. Over the period of study, there were only 26 instances where 
firms had technology knowledge over 100. The five firms with values over 100 were large diversified firms such as 
Sony and 3M. 
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Table 3. Simple Correlations for Main Effects and Controls 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Industry size        
2 
Market size 
by 
competitive 
group 0.6193***       
3 
Average 
Number of 
Competitors 0.0849* 0.1903***      
4 Era dummy 0.6043*** 0.4808*** 
-
0.1368***     
5 
Broad tech 
production  0.0681+ 0.3738*** 0.1277** 0.0169    
6 
Breadth of 
tech 
knowledge  0.2352*** 0.4424*** 0.0219 0.2593*** 0.2217***   
7 
Broad 
marketing 
production 0.0831+ 0.2529*** 0.0491 0.0715* 0.4369*** 0.1804***  
8 
Breadth of 
market 
knowledge  0.1280** 0.6461*** 0.1807*** 0.1496*** 0.4858*** 0.3229*** 0.3283*** 
n=766, *** p= < .001, ** p < .01, * p <. 05, + p < .10  
 
Table 4 reports the estimates for the control variables in Model 15.  In Models 2 and 3 (see Table 
4), we separately test for the individual effects of technology and market knowledge and 
production boundaries on firm survival.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed that breadth of technology knowledge and broad 
technology production boundaries would positively affect firm survival.  The coefficient for 
technology knowledge breadth is not significant (coefficient=.024, p =.112), and thus does not 
5 We did robustness testing with additional controls that could potentially affect survival, including percent change 
in US GDP (to account for changes in the economy that could have increased or decreased demand for computers 
and HDD), number of US competitors per year (the largest market in HDD was the US, so a greater number of 
competitors based in the US could decrease survival prospects of firms based elsewhere), product performance (a 
firm’s survival directly corresponds to how well its products perform), alliance count per firm per year (which 
indicates the degree that a firm expanded its boundaries through alliances, as these firms may get some of the same 
benefits as internal breadth but for a lesser cost). We found that the models were robust to these additional controls, 
but the model fit was better without them. 
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provide support for Hypothesis 1. This result may reflect inherent differences in the type of R&D 
firms had to engage in to be successful through systemic changes in the HDD industry. After a 
technological shift, much of the knowledge that was needed to get the drives to work was 
systems integration process knowledge. Firms had to engage in this type of process-related 
R&D, which was usually not patented because according to our interviewees, process patents 
were almost impossible to enforce. We tried to account for this in our measures by including 
R&D that was documented in Disk Trend Report but did not become patented, but much of the 
R&D firms engaged in was never made public and kept secret from competitors (Interviews 1, 2 
and 3 in Appendix A). There were patents granted in this industry, but many were granted to 
multiproduct firms that were involved in more than one industry with related technology, making 
it even more important for the firm to have patents to protect this knowledge. For example, one 
interviewee stated that MR head technology was patented by their firm many years before it was 
used in HDD so IBM could use it to compete in other arenas: “Early MR heads were used for 
magnetic stripe cards at Macy’s to read price tags just like credit cards, sensing magnetic 
bubbles, tape drives much earlier. IBM made these- so very broad R&D and product placement.” 
The patented technology then sat on a shelf until it was needed to solve a problem in another 
industry: “That’s when you would use your broad R&D to decide what to use to give you the 
transfer rate, capacity and reliability demanded.” (Interview 2, 1/23/13). Thus, firms with broad 
technological knowledge might have exited the industry at a higher rate, even if they had the 
capability to adapt, because their broad technological knowledge gave them other options.   
The coefficient for broad technology production boundaries is .701 (p < .10), providing 
marginal support for Hypotheses 2. The coefficients in the AFT model indicate whether the 
effect of a unit change in the covariate is to accelerate (a negative coefficient) or delay (a 
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positive coefficient) the time to failure.  The lognormal AFT estimation assumes a linear 
relationship between the log of survival time T and firm characteristics, such that ln(T) = XB + e, 
where the error term is distributed loglinearly.  Thus, one unit increase in Xi leads to a Bi 
increase in logged survival time.  Alternatively, the exponentiated coefficients or time ratio, eBi , 
tells the increase (for values >=1) or decrease (for values <1) in survival time relative to a 
baseline scenario.  This means that, using exp(.701), one standard deviation increase in 
technology production boundaries delays exit by 102%.  This result supports prior literature, 
which has found that technological change requires close coordination between firms and their 
suppliers (e.g. Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2010; Hoetker, 2005; Kapoor and Adner, 2012). It 
also supports our contention that systemic change is better handled in firms that are vertically 
integrated into the manufacturing function, enabling close coordination between manufacturing 
and design functions. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed a positive relationship between market knowledge breadth and 
firm survival. The coefficient of market knowledge breadth, measured by a firm’s product 
diversity, is .033 (p < .10), providing marginal support for Hypothesis 4. This means that, using 
exp(.033), one standard deviation increase in market knowledge boundaries delays exit by 3.4%.  
This finding could also be explained by more diversified revenue streams: firms had their 
revenues spread over more products and product classes, ensuring a revenue stream even when 
one product was not doing well (e.g. Berkovitz and Mitchell, 2007). However, there is also an 
opportunity cost to diversified revenue streams; firms that allocate resources to one division are 
taking away resources from another. Because diversification has costs, firms still need to choose 
wisely when evaluating a possible expansion to their product line (Levinthal and Wu, 2010). But 
there is additional literature that has found that firms involved with more than one product line 
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are better able to absorb and retain new knowledge (e.g. Shipilov, 2009), and, we argue, may 
build new capabilities that better enable multiproduct firms to adapt to systemic change. Our 
findings show an adaptive benefit to product diversity, which indicates to us that diverse revenue 
streams are not the only cost or benefit a firm receives from product diversity.  
Hypothesis 5 proposed a negative relationship between broad market production 
boundaries and firm survival, which was not supported (coefficient=-.293, p=.341 when run with 
product diversity market knowledge). Although our understanding of the industry suggested that 
each new form factor required a somewhat different set of downstream assets, to distribute and 
market products, these assets may have been more generic than we supposed. Also, it was 
difficult for us to separate the effects of market production boundaries from other factors such as 
firm size and diversification, and getting around the limitations of our data is a task for follow-on 
research to tackle. Many of the firms that did have investments in complementary assets (such as 
marketing, distribution, and sales networks) were large, diversified firms (i.e. Hitachi, Fujitsu, 
and Memorex, among others), that may have been able to share those assets across the different 
industries they competed in, and likely had more cash-on-hand to make those investments. Many 
of the smaller firms, which only competed in HDD, did not have the resources to invest in these 
assets, and relied more on personal contacts to get sales contracts with customers.   
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Table 4. Survival Models 
 
Variables Model 1: 
Controls 
Model 2: 
Controls+ 
Tech 
Knowledge 
and 
Production  
Model 3: 
Controls + 
Mkt 
Knowledge  
and 
Production 
Breadth of 
technological 
knowledge 
 0.023697 
(0.014932) 
 
Broad 
technological 
production 
 0.700934+ 
(0.384763) 
 
Breadth of market 
knowledge  
  -0.033153+ 
(0.018263) 
Broad market 
production 
  -0.293089 
(0.307989) 
Average Number 
of Competitors  
-0.026075+ 
(0.013700) 
-0.0278843+ 
(0.014873) 
-0.001315 
(0.010500) 
Industry size 
-0.000136 
(0.000104) 
-0.000122 
(0.000092) 
-0.000079 
(0.000093) 
Era dummy 
-1.260642 
(0.940431) 
-1.017841 
(0.851757) 
-0.579638 
(0.648131) 
Market size by 
competitive group 
0.000169+ 
(0.000095) 
-0.000013 
(0.000070) 
0.000071 
(0.000086) 
Constant 
3.277100*** 
(0.697995) 
2.954313*** 
(0.578973) 
2.795746*** 
(0.729270) 
X2 5.76 8.43 9.90 
Log likelihood -91.61655 -86.40719 -60.43027 
AIC 195.2331 188.8144 136.8605 
n=766, standard errors shown in parentheses, *** p= < .001, ** p < .01, * p <. 05, + p < .10 
 
We used dichotomous variables to classify firms according to their mix of broad and narrow 
boundaries, in order to test the relative advantages of broad knowledge and production 
boundaries.  For example, much like an ANOVA analysis, we look at firms with broad market 
production and broad market knowledge compared to firms with low market production and low 
market knowledge (Figure 8 details the percentage of firms with broad or narrow boundaries 
each year during the period of study). To test hypotheses 3 and 6, we used 2x2 matrices (similar 
to Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, Marsh, 2006; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
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2001) to compare the effects of different mixes of knowledge and production boundaries on firm 
survival. Table 5 shows correlations for each category, while Table 6 shows results for the 
survival models using these firm boundary classifications. Firms were classified annually as 
broad in tech or market production if they participated in an activity, such as technology 
production, and narrow if they did not. Firms were classified annually as broad in tech 
knowledge if the firm had patented in 2 industry relevant patent subclasses (within class 360, 
369, and 428), and classified as narrow in tech knowledge if the firm had patented in less than 2 
industry relevant patent subclasses. Firms were classified annually as broad in market knowledge 
if the firm was shipping drives in 2 or more product groups (as determined by Disk Trend 
Report), and classified as narrow if the firm was shipping drives in less than 2 product groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Percentage of Broad and Narrow Boundaries from 1976-1999 
 
  
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
80 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 %
 o
f f
ir
m
s 
w
it
h 
bo
un
da
ry
 ty
pe
 
Year 
broad narrow 
 52 
Table 5. Simple Correlations for Matrices 
    1 2 3 4 5 
1 
Broad tech 
knowledge, 
Broad tech 
production      
2 
Broad tech 
knowledge, 
narrow tech 
production -0.3705***     
3 
Narrow tech 
knowledge, 
broad tech 
production -0.2879*** -0.1153**    
4 
Broad mkt 
knowledge, 
broad market 
production 0.4384*** -0.0913* -0.0381   
5 
Broad mkt 
knowledge, 
narrow mkt 
production -0.0182 -0.0311 -0.0547 -0.0927*  
6 
Narrow mkt 
knowledge,  
broad mkt 
production -0.2399*** 0.1828*** 0.1230*** -0.6289*** 0.0031 
n=766, *** p= < .001, ** p < .01, * p <. 05, + p < .10 
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Table 6. Survival Models for Matrices 
Variables Model 4: 
Controls + 
Matrix Effects 
for Tech 
Knowledge 
and Production 
Model 5: 
Controls + 
Matrix 
Effects for 
Mkt 
Knowledge 
and 
Production 
Broad tech knowledge,  
Broad tech production 
0.967664+ 
(0.509075) 
 
Broad tech knowledge,  
Narrow tech production 
-0.284869 
(0.362620) 
 
Narrow tech knowledge,  
Broad tech production 
-0.851106 
(0.347107) 
 
Broad market knowledge,  
Broad market production 
 -1.19820* 
(0.565958) 
Broad market knowledge, 
Narrow market production 
 -1.281718* 
(0.536118) 
Narrow market knowledge, 
Broad market production 
 0.313239 
(0.211018) 
Market size by competitive group 
-0.000094 
(0.000061) 
0.000125* 
(0.000062) 
Average Number of Competitors  
-0.020857+ 
(0.012057) 
0.0211955+ 
(0.011460) 
Industry size 
-0.001081 
(0.000085) 
-0.000074 
(0.000062) 
Era dummy 
-0.659182 
(0.686322) 
-0.186837 
(0.388656) 
Constant 
2.923720*** 
(0.549179) 
3.025350*** 
(0.642886) 
X2 10.96 19.27* 
Log likelihood -83.89827 -43.35217 
AIC 185.7965 104.7043 
n=766, standard errors shown in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10 
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For Matrix 1 in Model 4 (see Table 6 and Figure 9), we tested the effects of the following 
categories of firm boundaries: broad technological knowledge with narrow technology 
production, broad technological knowledge with broad technology production, and narrow 
technological knowledge with broad technology production. We used narrow technological 
knowledge with narrow technological production as our reference group. We found that when 
these variables were run with controls, the combination of broad technological knowledge and 
broad technological production effects had a significant coefficient of .968 (p<.10), which 
provides marginal support for Hypothesis 3: Firms with both broad technology knowledge and 
broad technology production exit slower than firms with narrow technology knowledge and 
narrow technology production. 
 
 
Figure 9. Matrix 1 
 
For Matrix 2 (see Table 6 and Figure 10) in Model 5, we tested the effects of the following 
combinations: broad market knowledge with narrow market production, broad market 
knowledge with broad market production, and narrow market knowledge with broad market 
production. We used the narrow market knowledge with narrow market production effect as our 
reference group. We found that when these variables were run with controls, the combination of 
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broad market knowledge and broad market production effects had a significant coefficient of -
1.19 (p<.05). The combination of broad market knowledge and narrow market production effects 
also had a significant coefficient of -1.28 (p<.05). This supports Hypothesis 6, as the effect of 
broad market knowledge on firm survival is dampened when the firm also has broad market 
production. It is clear from our Hypothesis 6 finding that market production assets decrease the 
positive effects of market knowledge on firm survival.  
 
 
Figure 10. Matrix 2 
 
In order to account for potential endogeneity in the technology production variable, I used the 
Inverse Mills Ratio with a dichotomous variable describing whether a firm manufactured captive 
drives or not. Captive drives are drives that are both manufactured and used by the firm in its 
own computer products. Theoretically, we would expect these firms to be more likely to be 
vertically integrated into technology production than other firms, as they manufacture multiple 
computer components. I found that this variable was significantly predicted the technology 
production variable (p=.018) but did not predict firm survival, our dependent variable. Model 2 
was tested including and excluding the Inverse Mills Ratio, and results were not significantly 
affected. Table 7 shows the main effects for Model 2 with and without the Mills Ratio. 
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In order to account for potential endogeneity in the market production variable, I used the 
Inverse Mills Ratio with a variable measuring how many firms entered the HDD market each 
year. Theoretically, we would expect that as more firms entered the industry and competition 
became denser, firms would invest in marketing and distribution assets in order to differentiate 
their products and make sure they were addressing large customers’ needs. I found that this 
variable was indeed strongly correlated with the market production variable (p=.000) but did not 
predict firm survival, our dependent variable. Model 3 was tested including and excluding the 
Inverse Mills Ratio, and results were not significantly affected. Table 7 shows the main effects 
for Model 3 with and without the Mills Ratio. 
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Table 7. Survival Models with Inverse Mills Ratio 
Variables Model 2: 
Controls+ 
Tech 
Knowledge 
and 
Production  
Model 3: 
Controls + 
Mkt 
Knowledge 
(prod 
diversity) and 
Production 
Broad 
technological 
knowledge 
0.023697 
(0.014932) 
 
Broad 
technological 
production 
0.700934+ 
(0.384763) 
 
Broad market 
knowledge  
 -0.033153+ 
(0.018263) 
Broad market 
production 
 -0.293089 
(0.307989) 
Average Number 
of Competitors  
-0.0278843+ 
(0.014873) 
-0.001315 
(0.010500) 
Industry size 
-0.000122 
(0.000092) 
-0.000079 
(0.000093) 
Era dummy 
-1.017841 
(0.851757) 
-0.579638 
(0.648131) 
Market size by 
competitive group 
-0.000013 
(0.000070) 
0.000071 
(0.000086) 
Constant 
2.954313*** 
(0.578973) 
2.795746*** 
(0.729270) 
X2 8.43 9.90 
Log likelihood -86.40719 -60.43027 
AIC 188.8144 136.8605 
n=766, standard errors shown in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10 
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5.0  DISCUSSION 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we find that when firms encounter 
systemic change, their market boundaries confer adaptive advantages differently than 
technological boundaries (technological production produces an advantage, market production 
does not), which contributes to the TCE literature. In the case of manufacturing, prior TCE 
literature has stated that firms should base their “make or buy” decisions on cost, picking the 
least expensive option. We found that in a systemic change context, a firm that manufactures 
components internally has a distinct advantage over firms that outsource, even though prior 
evidence (e.g. McKendrick, 2000) has indicated that outsourcing was less expensive in this 
industry. This finding may be directly related to the status of standards in the industry. When 
standards are open and technology is stable, firms are able to cheaply outsource components and 
easily integrate them into their final products. But when standards are closed and the technology 
is unstable, firms will have trouble integrating outsourced components into their products 
because their interface specifications have changed. Firms that have both technological 
knowledge from R&D and manufacturing capabilities are better able to incorporate the new 
technology quickly, increasing their chances of survival (supporting Hypothesis 3). In our 
industry context, firms that manufacture technology have a big advantage when systemic change 
is frequent and standards are in flux. Supplier firms are only able to stay in business when the 
technology is stable, so when change occurs, firms are no longer able to rely on outsourcing for 
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their component needs, and must manufacture their own, giving firms that already have 
manufacturing capabilities a definitive advantage over firms that must build those capabilities 
from scratch. 
In the case of activities downstream from manufacturing, past literature has cited the 
importance of marketing, distribution, and sales to the successful commercialization of a new 
technology, but we find that they do not necessarily assist adaptation to systemic change. 
 After a systemic change, we found that firms that had these marketing and distribution assets 
were not more likely to survive, directly opposite to the effects of technological 
production/manufacturing we found in Hypothesis 2. 
Our study also builds on Kapoor and Adner (2012)’s conclusions on technological 
boundaries by testing the effects of boundary choice on a firm’s adaptation to systemic change 
(rather than architectural or component change). We found several notable differences in results 
that we attribute to the effects of disruptive change. For example, Kapoor and Adner (2012) 
found that knowledge about outsourced components (broad technological knowledge 
boundaries) seems to help time-to-market for completely outsourced firms, but not partially 
outsourced/partially-integrated firms. This result suggests that to improve time-to-market, firms 
that produce technology with multiple components should outsource all components (have 
narrow production boundaries) while keeping the knowledge associated with the components 
internal (have broad technological knowledge boundaries), or a firm should have both broad 
technological knowledge boundaries and broad technological production boundaries. In contrast, 
our findings show that in a multiple component device (although we do not have data on the 
outsourcing of each individual component), firms that have broad technological knowledge 
boundaries without broad technological production boundaries do not have an adaptive 
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advantage. We also found that broad production boundaries alone (without the accompanying 
broad technological knowledge boundary) enhance a firm’s survival through systemic change. 
This finding, in addition to Kapoor and Adner’s findings, gives us more insight into adaptation 
through change. Kapoor and Adner’s study focused on a sustaining innovation, where standards 
were open and performance requirements stayed static, so after a technological change, 
component suppliers were still able to continue to provide components, and firms with 
technological knowledge on the components would be able to integrate them successfully into 
their products. In our context, we look at disruptive innovations with product offerings that 
included new features but didn’t initially meet performance requirements established by previous 
technology, and standards for interface were periodically closed. Thus, supplier firms were not 
able to stay in business when change occurred and the standards were unknown, and firms with 
manufacturing capabilities were better able to survive than firms that did not and had to build 
these capabilities from the ground up. 
In addition, we believe our study’s DV of survival through systemic change gives a better 
measure of adaptation than does looking only at product introductions. Survival through 
systemic change is only possible if the firm not only introduced a product, but also included the 
features its customers wanted, and the firm was able to market/commercialize the technology to 
the new customer base. In the HDD industry, there are examples of situations where a firm 
shipped a new, technologically sophisticated product quickly but it was not successfully 
commercialized, which is what a firm ultimately needs for industry survival (e.g. the Kittyhawk 
drive introduced by Hewlett-Packard). In order to survive through systemic change, firms must 
match new product introduction to customer needs. 
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In sum, our study indicates that it is important to study knowledge and production 
boundaries together, and to consider market as well as technology boundaries.  Our findings 
begin to clarify conflicting results in prior work on technological change and the role of firm 
boundaries in affecting survival.  By drawing attention to the unique challenges posed by 
systemic change, which upends established product architectures and thus demands new ways of 
working across organizational and technology boundaries, we identify a contingency that affects 
which boundaries support adaptation when they are broad. 
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6.0  LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We used patents to measure technology knowledge boundaries, but because of the importance of 
process knowledge in this industry, we added qualitative data on firms that did R&D but did not 
patent. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that firms kept their R&D secret and the 
R&D was not accounted for in public sources like Disk Trend Report, which may have led to our 
null finding. Future research might look at an industry where IP was less process-oriented and 
more likely to be patented, to see if this changes the relationship between technology knowledge 
and firm survival. 
We also did not isolate the effects of one particular technological change, but instead 
observed firms’ survival through a series of technological change over a 23-year period. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that a firms’ configuration of boundaries may have been 
appropriate for one change, but not another, causing the firm to fail. Future research could take a 
piecewise approach to see what boundary conditions are appropriate for individual changes to 
market or technological systems. 
We did not consider additional moderating factors that could contribute to firm failure, 
such as macroeconomic factors, or individual firm capital structures. Difficult economic 
conditions could cause firms to fail more quickly, regardless of a firm’s chosen boundary 
configuration. Firm capital structures may also affect a firm’s appetite for risk, which could in 
turn affect a firm’s boundary choices or their choice to stay in the industry. Firms financed by 
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bank loans, for example, may be so hampered by debt service payments that they do not have the 
ability to invest in expensive manufacturing assets, and thus may be less likely to have broad 
technological production boundaries to survive through change. These firms may be more likely 
to diversify out of the industry when change occurs, in order to stay current on bank loans. 
Future research could investigate the effects of these potential moderators on firm boundary 
choices and, ultimately, firm survival through systemic change.  
Our findings address whether and how firms’ knowledge and production boundary 
choices maximize survival prospects in industries composed of highly fragmented and atomistic 
competitors, where collaboration is not the norm. In contexts where collaboration is the norm, 
we would expect firms to use alliances to gain access to technological knowledge, manufacturing 
functions, and complementary assets necessary to survive through systemic change, thus 
changing a firm’s ideal boundary configuration. 
We used firm survival as the dependent variable in our study, but the speed of product 
introductions is also important to consider, in order for us to observe how quickly firms are able 
to respond to systemic change with different boundary configurations and to determine how 
important the speed of response is to firm survival during systemic change. In the HDD context, 
this would include the speed to introduce a new form factor, after the first one has been 
introduced (as listed in Figure 3), and the speed to introduce the products with major component 
innovations (as listed in Figure 4). 
We chose to focus on two of the three firm systems affected by systemic change: the 
technological (defines what a firm makes and includes R&D and manufacturing design) and 
market systems (defines how a firm reaches a market and derives profits from it). These systems 
are more easily studied than the organizational system, which defines how a firm accomplishes 
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R&D and manufacturing through structure and routines, and is internal, not easily codified, and 
difficult to measure. Future research could not only address the effects of systemic change on 
organizational systems, but also could address which of the three systems (technological, market, 
and organizational) adapt first to the systemic change. Although organizational systems’ 
structure and routines inherently constrain what technological and market adaptations can be 
made, it is not clear which system firms first focus their attention after a change. 
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 INTERVIEWS WITH INDUSTRY EXPERTS 
We used this very general interview protocol for semi-structured interviews with industry 
experts. 
 
Interview Guide: 
 
• Goals: To understand the technology and the chronology of technological changes. To 
discern how often and in what ways technological change in the industry involved 
systemic changes.  To understand what firms had to do in order to adapt to or introduce 
particular technological innovations – what changes to the product’s design, 
manufacturing, interface with customers and suppliers were required?  To understand the 
different kinds of choices firms made about their knowledge and production boundaries 
and what the observed consequences of those choices were.   
 
1. Component and architectural changes featured in prior studies of the industry:  
 
• Thin film inductive heads: (1981) 
• MR heads: (1991) 
• Thin film media: (1983) 
• Form factor changes: (1979, 1980, 1983, 1989) 
 
• Were these most important? Are we missing any? 
 
• How did these changes affect the market/customer bases you concentrated on? 
 
• How did these changes affect how the other components worked together? 
 
• How difficult were these changes to incorporate into products? 
 
2. Looking for the following kinds of insights regarding the hypotheses – the role 
and relevance of particular kinds of technological, market, and functional (value chain) 
knowledge and activities for innovation, e.g.: 
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--Do firms that manufacture get insight into component interactions they wouldn’t get if 
they outsourced? 
 
--Do firms that do broad R&D on multiple components have a better shot at betting on 
the right technology? 
 
--Did firms that did broad R&D but outsourced the manufacturing have a better shot at 
being able to incorporate tech changes? 
 
--How did doing your own manufacturing affect speed of product introductions? 
 
--How did broad R&D affect speed of product introductions? 
 
--Do firms that do their own marketing/distribution have a better chance at seeing the 
promise of new markets? Worse chance? 
 
--Do firms that have broader exposure to markets, through alliances and geographies, 
have a better chance at seeing the promise of new markets? Worse chance? 
 
--Broad patenting a good measure of R&D? 
 
3. Conclusion: Ask for additional contacts 
 
• Is there anyone else we should talk to at your firm (or other firms in the industry) 
regarding research on the technologies we talked about today? 
 
 
 
• Is there anyone else we should talk to at your firm (or other firms in the industry) 
regarding manufacturing of the components we talked about today and the decision to in-
source or outsource? 
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A.2 NOTES ON INTERVIEW WITH INDUSTRY SOURCE 1- 1-18-13: 
 
Industry source 1 worked at a large HDD firm (433,362 employees) before leaving to work at a 
disk drive component supplier firm, where he managed applied research, product and process 
development, customer support and manufacturing. All notes below are his specific comments on 
industry trends. 
 
• There is no simple pattern to failures 
 
• 1 (IBM) to 50 to 3 (WD, Seagate and Toshiba- Toshiba has miniscule market share and 
probably won’t survive) 
 
• IBM was first- inventor of the hard drive- had 100% market share, but out of the business 
today- led in technology-  major developments were all led by IBM (heads, data channels 
and coding methods)- here’s a case where you have the leader who couldn’t make it 
 
• There were companies that for short periods of time were able to be/call themselves first 
followers behind companies like IBM- but very dangerous world to live in, one slip-up 
and they’d fall out of the race- kept up with tech through buying the technology through 
buying competitors and component suppliers who had a better tech capability than their 
internal capability. 
 
• Just having prowess in manufacturing was necessary but not sufficient to do well. Others 
failed because they were too late to take advantage of offshore manufacturing- HDD 
industry was second after semiconductor industry to move manufacturing operations 
offshore to Southeast Asia to countries like Singapore and Malaysia and Thailand, and 
now China, but not everyone did it in a timely manner. Those who didn’t do it in a timely 
manner, who continued to manufacture in US or Europe, failed because they had an 
unaffordable cost structure. Had nothing to do with the component capability or 
technology, it had to do with simple economics- the costs weren’t there. 
 
• He doesn’t think there was a pattern to failure/led to these results- there were many many 
reasons that led to these results- in the end, each firm was a unique case study- had their 
own unique circumstances that affected their business 
 
• some failed because they made fundamental mistakes- failures included: betting on the 
wrong technology, company changes in corporate responsibility- restructuring mistakes- 
moved things back and forth from different countries (losing a few generations of 
products- which is like losing a lifetime in this business) 
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• Manufacturing process necessary but not sufficient to survive 
 
• Some firms failed because they were too slow to move production offshore- unaffordable 
cost structure in manufacturing in US and Europe 
 
• The main customers in the HDD industry were computer makers- Dell, Apple, H-P, etc.- 
the overwhelming majority of products historically went into desktop PCs- today over 
50% of HDD goes into laptops 
 
• those companies insist on having at least 2 drive suppliers for each computer product- 
doesn’t matter what kind of tech leadership a firm has in making a drive, it may just be 
the first to market it 
 
• won’t get serious volumes until a 2nd firm was ready to ship as well because none of the 
computer companies wanted to take the risk of having only one supplier- every firm has 
had hiccups in their history of shipping drives- so had to be first 2 or 3 there (3 if product 
had very high volume) 
 
• industry created de facto standards- if you’re first to market with a certain drive, have to 
wait until another firm was also shipping this, someone might buy a negligible quantity 
for advertising, but substantive volumes always required multiple suppliers to be there at 
the same time. The trick for the drive makers was to match the standards (i.e. data rate) 
and try to positively differentiate themselves with higher reliability (customers happy 
because higher quality would reflect itself in the quality of the computer product itself) 
and lower cost (allowing them to be profitable) 
 
• wanted higher reliability and high enough volume and capacity/performance that matched 
the computer product 
 
• very expensive for Apple to replace hard drives because they fail- they look at total cost 
of ownership- once you match capacity and performance, then they look very carefully at 
quality and price. Hard to win in this type of world. 
 
• if you didn’t have the latest tech, you would need even more components (extra head or 
extra half disc to achieve a particular capacity) which increased cost to match the 
capacity (but offshore helped here and could make it cheaper to do with inferior products- 
may end up cheaper than something with fewer component manufactured in US and 
Japan)- so many variables that influenced your ability to survive. 
 
• No one failed because they couldn’t get the tech right- but some component suppliers did 
Examples: 
• Ampex: pioneer in film disks- Alar film disk which Ampex tried to commercialize in a 
massive way by betting on electro plated tech to make disk- plating the disk- bet on this, 
but failure- disk magnetically was fine could never create disk that had a long enough 
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lifetime (mechanical robustness, durability)-high/unacceptable failure rate, had head 
crashes 
 
• Applied Magnetics: (US)- large head maker- waited too long to invest in MR head 
technology- stuck to ferrite heads far longer than anybody else, then late in film heads, 
then late in MR heads, other competitors got there first- went out of business 
 
• Silmag: (France)- had very nifty film head and MR technology on silicon chip- no 
laborious process of making sliders- all you had to do was dice like you did for 
semiconductors, but by the time they got all the tech wrinkles straightened out, first with 
inductive heads- too late to market with inductive heads- failed because of this- lagged 
industry needs by 3 years (3 generations of product- a year is a generation of products)- 
impossible to recover from that. 
 
• HDD manufacturers failed b/c of mistakes: where they manufactured (which affected 
costs), the technology itself. i.e. mistake that almost imploded IBM’s business: laptops 
needed drives that were shock resistant- laptop moves a lot and runs risk of damaging the 
drive- aluminum bases too fragile- glass substrates more robust hard drives (to this day 
100% of laptop drives are glass substrate), but there were 2 issues with these 1. Cost 
more to make 2. Inferior disk (signal to noise ratio worse, etc.). IBM then moved to 100% 
glass disks for all its drives, abandoning aluminum substrates for desktops and servers 
(not just laptops) but needed extra disks to make up for capacity issues- cost too much- 
glass not as robust in enterprise systems- cost them at least one generation of products 
and customers- destroyed profitability- caused IBM to sell the business to Hitachi- could 
no longer match companies’ profit objectives. 
 
• 2 companies that did MR head technology (IBM and HP) did tech for MR head- IBM 
version was reverse engineered by the rest of the industry (they waited for product to 
come out, took it apart- spent 2-3 years before they mastered the tech and they could 
commercialize MR heads. 
 
• H-P chose not to make its own technology- chose to use Headway in California- 
outsourced to Komag affiliate Headway- made wafers. Established a 3 way partnership- 
H-P, Seagate, and Headway. Headway (later purchased by TDK- only head maker around 
today) made wafers, H-P provided technology. Seagate then took the wafers, did HGA, 
kept some for itself, gave rest to H-P. During this process, Seagate learned to make the 
MR heads by watching Headway (benefited from 20 yrs of research at H-P). 
 
• Some people stole trade secrets, some people hired people from IBM who knew the tech- 
if someone has a breakthrough significant enough- the others in the industry will find a 
way to grab hold of it, but the question is can they grab hold of it in a timely manner? 
With MR heads- 2 different routes- IBM and H-P partnership. 
 
• No pattern for how these technologies came to be and how they diffused- have to look at 
on a case by case basis. 
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• Xerox Parc- created all sorts of innovations they never capitalized on- i.e. the mouse tech 
first commercialized by Apple- 1970s- trying to make a $10K computer with $1K in 
storage (extraordinary target for the 1970s)- strong effort in film media-but they never 
commercialized, founder of Komag worked there- licensed this tech to Komag (a 
supplier)- Komag founded with most advanced thin film tech- beat IBM and everyone 
else in the market with very robust film disks- because of the investment Xerox never 
commercialized- better than anyone else’s.  
 
• Then you have Headway making heads- so you have Komag and Headway there, so you 
can start a business of just assembly and try to differentiate yourself by cost or electronic 
function of drive 
 
• Conner Peripherals- disk drive company founded by Finis Conner, veteran of Seagate- 
did self-testing instead of expensive testers (which everyone eventually copied- build in 
microprocessors that would do it for the drive)- much cheaper- then could use component 
suppliers. Became one of the most successful companies in its era- without any real tech 
capability- they set off the Komags and TDKs/component suppliers- they differentiated 
themselves by how smartly they used electronics to decrease cost of hard drive. That 
wasn’t good enough to be a long term strategy- everyone copied- they were eventually 
purchased by Seagate. 
 
• Seagate started out as an assembler- but eventually realized to survive or thrive, they 
purchased suppliers and tech capability they didn’t have- head and disk making of their 
own (most notably, CDC- Minnesota and OK). Then eventually bought Conner. 
 
• WD started the same way- bought Read Rite as head maker, Komag as disk maker, and 
Hitachi’s disk drive business- VI-ed 
 
• Seagate and WD smart enough to make moves in VI- enabled them to survive. 
 
• He thinks that VI is the best but there are some issues- internal suppliers become 
complacent- won’t lead on tech or cost- one way to keep the group honest is to purchase 
½ of your components elsewhere (the surviving HDD makers do this today, using TDK 
as their supplier)- helps Seagate and WD rigorously measure capabilities of internal 
groups and force them to keep up with external supplier 
 
• Component supplier has visibility to more than one HDD maker- can be a learning 
conduit for new technology- can teach how to incorporate but it takes time. They did this 
when companies struggled because it was in their own best interest- if the firm failed 
(because they didn’t have the R&D to use the part supplied), they could no longer sell 
heads to them. It took longer to do this (learn from supplier) and firms would miss a 
generation- which cost firms a lot- would bring something to market that customers did 
not use/want because they were behind on technology. 
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• Firms didn’t fail because of not being able to do the new technology- but they maybe 
underestimated the new tech and thought they could do the same thing with the old stuff- 
that’s what killed them. 
 
• Those that bet on wrong tech ended up missing a generation- were behind on the capacity 
for next one too. Had to be at the right capacity 
 
• Most companies could survive one miss (missing a generation of products) – no one has 
survived 2 misses- but too costly to survive more than one. Most firms that went out of 
business blew 1 or 2 generations of products. 
 
• Misses aren’t recent mistakes, it’s a problem that began 2 or 3 years ago when R&D 
should have begun. 
 
• Broader R&D could increase chances of betting correctly. IBM, HP, Control Data, DEC, 
Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu all did this- but all these guys (Hitachi just left) are out of business. 
All had invested in serious/significant R&D efforts. 
 
• The survivors are the purebred dogs, not necessarily the longest living, but stronger and 
more capable- survivors are those with assembly as their heritage- then over time they 
gradually integrated and today they are a mixture of outsourcing and VI. WD and Seagate 
were not pioneers in R&D until recent history. 
 
• All the firms in the industry are dependent on each other’s patents- all cross-license- 
because everyone lives in “glass houses”- only litigious against outsiders. 
 
• Very tight profit margin- 15% (used to be 80% for IBM back in the day, higher than 
Intel-Windows has now!)- have to be flawless with production in order to survive (50 
cents different can be a huge difference)- must be competitive in capacity, quality and 
price. WD and Seagate succeeded because they were the most ruthless in their focus on 
cost and execution. 
 
• He predicts that VI/outsourcing now is the good combo for now- but maybe not in 10 
years, impossible to predict because no 10 years in the industry were the same. 
 
• Patenting- He worked in the dept at ___ that decided what to publish, what to keep a 
secret, and what you had to patent (protective of product)- some firms would purposely 
patent things they weren’t actually working on that were innovative and that were not 
going to commercialize to fool competitors- often surprised them. Very difficult for 
someone working outside ___ to know what they were really working on. 10% of the 
patents filed may be useful, 10% of that 10% becomes really significant (1% of all 
patents). Difficult process to be judge a priori of how successful patent will be. 
 
• Many companies benefited from Xerox Parc before they got their own internal capability. 
Seagate spent 5 years working on MR heads, but H-P and IBM spent 20.  
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• IBM was late on film disk- even though they’d been working on it since mid- 1960s- but 
were late- it was introduced by another firm in 1983, was not introduced by IBM in 1988. 
 
• Manufacturing- speed depended on the company- no general rule- VI groups could 
become complacent. 
 
• But did this manufacturing give you knowledge that helped you through a change? 
 
• it helped you in time-to-market, could also help in quality (if you ran cleaner facility, 
would affect long-term reliability and customer satisfaction)- would pay more. 
 
• ruthless- beat them up on quality, price, and warranty terms (would return products that 
did not work)- made suppliers more diligent, and paid attention to manufacturing 
technology and location. Not everyone was as diligent with these details- but this is why 
these firms survived. 
 
• Manufacturing quality and location mattered: Location off-shore provided the firm with a 
cost-effective labor force (1/20 salary of same engineer in silicon valley), subsidies- tax 
holidays- no taxes or duties on products for the first 5 years and ever after if you improve 
your factory (WD and Seagate were pioneers at this). 
 
• Differences among companies in recognizing new markets:  
 
• i.e. Seagate saw IBM PC as a market, even though IBM did not, Integral Peripherals saw 
mobile opportunity.  
 
• Usually new entrants/startups found the market for new form factors- then big firms 
entered when it got big enough. Only after they demonstrated that these moves were 
significant did established firms move to offer that product as well. 
 
• He does not think diversity of market exposure made a difference: profit margins seemed 
too low to make it worth it. 
 
• Book- The Innovator’s Dilemma- not everything he writes about is accurate, but there is 
a strong grain of truth 
 
• IBM knew they needed a drive for PC- but they had no idea how to make a drive to meet 
that cost target- they were making Ferraris and they wanted a Volkswagen and they 
didn’t know how to bridge this- but only 20% gross margin (1/4 the profits of what they 
were currently making) and as far as they know the success in a particular marketplace 
will sustain them forever- but have to be a visionary to see that things could slip.  
 
• It took Al Shugart to recognize importance of PC- but he had to leave IBM to chase this. 
 
• Latecomers made it to the market eventually (IBM was a latecomer to mobile market, but 
still got 50% of the market when they entered)- but even with successive changes, firms 
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had trouble judging what markets to go into. 2 instances where IBM pioneered- RAMAC 
and the microdrive which had a short life towards the end of the time they were in the 
industry- everything else they waited for others to pioneer. 
 
• WD and Seagate were both late to mobile market- but both have presences now. 
 
• Outsourcing marketing and distribution could help but not always- needed to sell drives 
to your competitors in HDD (like establishing relations with North Korea), which was 
difficult. IBM attacked this problem by hiring marketing people with experience in those 
channels- took too long to develop- hired people from other HDD firms and customer 
firms. 
 
• THEME: Lots of successes and failures and difficult to compartmentalize/categorize 
failures. Usually it’s an “outsider” person- he used the words “maniacs with a vision” 
(from within the company or outside it) who instigates change- hard to make a 
revolutionary change inside a big firm. 
 
• His response to my thesis hypotheses: 4 core competencies a firm needed to succeed in 
HDD: 1. Research 2. Manufacturing 3. Marketing/Distribution/Sales 4. Service- need to 
be strong in all 4 functions- and they all must be highly interactive with each other- have 
to be connected on a regular basis- hard to do when outsourcing.  
 
• Could look at companies business units- why were some successful and some failed and 
strong collaboration. 
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A.3 NOTES ON INTERVIEW WITH INDUSTRY SOURCE 2- 1/23/13 
Industry source 2 spent over 30 years in the industry at a large HDD firm (433,362 employees) 
on the technology side of the firm, where he was one of the inventors of a major disk drive 
component technology. All notes below are his specific comments on industry trends. 
 
• He was in the garage so he says he was weak on the dates 
 
• 1956- first disk drive- RAMAC- 30” aluminum disk (magnetic recording surface), coated 
with brown paint (iron oxide) a spinout process.  Metal head (little inductor with a gap in 
it, so you had a coil wrapped around the little gap and that magnetizes the stuff on the 
disk). The head and the disk were the two major technological pieces. And with the head 
I include the air bearing that keeps the head from hitting the disk when it goes by. The 
third thing was the electronics. If you ever saw a RAMAC, it is the size of a double wide 
refrigerator. It’s hooked up to the electronics, which is a set of vacuum tubes, huge also.  
 
• During the evolution, there were lots and lots of changes: 3 big changes: 1. change from a 
particulate disk (paint) to thin film disk media 2. change from conventional recording 
head to a MR (magneto resistive) head 3. change from giant control units to a small, 
relatively compact circuit electronics thing you put on the drive. 
 
• my own specialty: thin film head and originally it was a regular magnetic conductor thin 
film head, although he started working on both of them in 1969 or so, 1970. So as far as 
I’m concerned, the thin film head, and the  inductive head and the MR head are at pretty 
much the same time, but from a product point of view, MR head took 20 years (came out 
in 1991), thin film inductive heads was much earlier, at least 10 years earlier.  
 
• The reason that the MR head was a bigger change than the thin film head was because the 
thin film head, in some sense, was a drop-in replacement for the previous inductive head, 
which is a ferrite head, which is pretty much a drop in replacement for the original metal 
head. If you showed someone who worked on the original heads and you showed them 
the ferrite head which was a magnetic material and smaller, and then you showed them 
the thin film head, well, we got rid of the ladies with the needles who were trying to wind 
wire around an infinitesimal gizmo and replaced it with thin film fabrication techniques. 
But they’re all essentially the same, so there’s no trouble- if you understood one, you 
would have no trouble understanding the other. And the MR head, of course, was a 
different animal entirely. 
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• I used to give the newcomers a kind of little lecture on why the MR head turned 
everything upside down. Previous heads, when you went from one generation to another, 
was a big deal in head department, and you also had to talk to the guys who had to decide 
what voltage of currents to run through it, but other than that, they’re all pretty much the 
same, they affected mostly the head department. When we went to the MR head, we had 
to change of course, the head department, change the disk, because, well I can tell you 
why, but we had to coat the disk. We had to change the electronics, the equalization as 
it’s called- the signal was different. We had to change the servo dept because up until that 
time, the same recording head wrote the track and read it (a single head device). But an 
MR head only reads, so you had to build it with an inductive head stuck on top of it. And 
since they’re never exactly in the same alignment, you had to get the servo people to 
switch a little bit of track switch every time you switched between reading and writing, 
partly a big deal because by that time, even when you were writing, between that receptor 
you had to read the servo information which tells you where the head is positioned. So it 
changed all of that. Then you also had potential corrosion problems, so the people who 
were in charge of the atmosphere within the drive had to change what they were doing 
and then there was endless testing, and it turns out these heads were susceptible to 
electrostatic charge, static zap. So if the ladies wiggle their butt on the chair and get an 
electrostatic charge while assembling drive, it would blow up the head.  So there was a 
whole new testing regime, a whole new manufacturing procedure. If I think about it more 
I’ll probably come up with other departments that were affected. But the short answer is, 
changing from a thin film to an inductive head was small potatoes compared to affecting 
everybody when you went to an MR head, and that’s one of the reasons why the industry 
lagged behind a while. 
 
• Between the MR to GMR head, there’s a significant difference inside the head, but to the 
outside there seems to be no difference at all, they behave exactly the same, it’s just that 
GMR head has a bigger signal. Well, you can say it was a very important development 
because it let you make the heads smaller to get the same signal, which of course was 
what every new generation of drives has to do. So it was good that way, but it was not an 
upheaval. 
 
• Here’s another example: in a disk drive of those days, probably even still today, there are 
inevitable contacts between the heads and the disks. Because you just can’t make a disk 
smooth enough, because you’re flying so close, you could never get a speck of dust in 
there, but even so, any little ripple on the disk touches the head, and didn’t affect the 
inductive head except it might wear it, but an MR head was thermo transient (drove 
electronics crazy), so there was a long and difficult set of work in the electronics side and 
in the channel side, to deal with the thermo-transience. So they just didn’t exist before 
that. Imperfections on the disk when head goes by, it actually mechanically touched, it 
didn’t have to be a magnetic particle it touched, often it was just a speck of something 
that was there in the disk manufacturing process, but as it went by the head, it caused a 
little thermo blip indistinguishable from a magnetic blip, so it drove the channel crazy. 
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• Form factors: every new generation of disk drives shrank the components inside them. If 
you wanted to cut the loop on the areal density, you had to cut the track length in half and 
the bit length in half, and in the early days, you didn’t want a time, you first cut the track, 
and put out a generation of drives with twice the capacity. And then you put twice as 
many bits per inch along the track and that would be the next generation. Then you would 
go back to having the tracks again. And each time you do that, you have to make the 
magnetic grains on the disk had to be finer to keep the signal from getting read, you made 
the gap in head narrower to get more BPI along it. You had to make the width of the head 
half so you could get twice as many tracks per inch. But those were just evolutionary and 
they went on for many years. Everyone knew what their job was, you would have a 
smaller signal so you had to do something to filter out the noise. If you were increasing 
the linear density you had to fly closer by a factor of 2. So all the air bearing people and 
wear and reliability people had to worry about that, but they knew what their orders were. 
But the MR head was a new set of orders. In addition to all of that, there was more. 
 
• There was one major evolutionary change- the thin film disk- to get rid of the paint, and 
that was very difficult for the disk people and the reliability people who had to worry 
about lubricating and wear and so forth, but it didn’t affect the other departments very 
much 
 
• Perpendicular recording- it actually is a modest change in the head department but it’s a 
big change in the disk department. And the reason is, in the original longitudinal 
recording, the magnetic field that writes is produced by the head and nothing else. 
Whereas in perpendicular recording, part of that head is in the disk. So when you 
energize that head for the field, now you’re producing a field that is perpendicular to the 
disk. So it goes through the recording layer and into a software which is effectively part 
of the head and closes the magnetic circuit. So a big change to disk people, to the head 
people, the write head looks a little different, the read head looks the same. That isn’t 
really affected. The write head, instead of being in the shape of a letter C with a gap, now 
it’s in the shape of a letter I and points down at the disk. Then somewhere there’s a return 
path much larger that closes the loop. But it doesn’t write, the writing is done by the point 
of the little I. So it’s a significant change to the head but it’s a terrific change for the disk. 
 
• Got into this because when you shrank the size of the recorded disk, there’s a signal noise 
problem, the head signal gets lost, but also, the number of little magnetic grains in the 
disk shrinks too, so you have to make them smaller. Because if the number of grains in 
there gets to be less than 20 or 30, then the signal gets really ragged, and you have trouble 
telling a 1 from a 0. So the problem is when you shrink the size of everything, the little 
permanent magnet gets magnetized and it has a certain amount of stored energy in it. And 
you have to put the energy in it to flip it to the other direction. And when you scale the 
size of the grain by 2, it changes the volume by 8. And the energy in that same material 
for the grain, half the size, is 8 times lower. It still takes just as big a field to write it. But 
the problem is that the little magnet is bouncing around with energy of “kt”- Thermal 
noise is ubiquitous in physics- unless you are at absolute zero, it’s never quiet. If 
something can bounce around, it will bounce around, and the amount of energy, that’s on 
average, is kt. Ordinarily it’s a very tiny amount of energy so you don’t see things 
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bouncing around. When the grains get small enough, this bouncing around is enough to 
make them flip and flip back and then the disk is completely erased. So if you keep 
scaling down the medium, eventually you get something that won’t work at room 
temperature, which it has to do. Only way you can do that is use smaller grains with 
smaller magnets- takes more energy/longer to flip. The new magnets are much more 
powerful than the old ones used to be. Very best magnets now 50 times stronger, it takes 
50 times as much energy to flip one. Rather than shrinking down the disk, eventually they 
ran into this problem and they had to start using stronger and stronger permanent 
magnetic materials to write the data on or else it would self erase. Stronger materials take 
a bigger field, and pretty soon, you get the permanent magnet grains you can’t write with 
a write head and you might try to make better and better write heads but eventually you 
run out of juice there. There’s a reason for that, because the strongest soft materials that 
you could make a head out of are iron cobalt and when you saturate them, you reach a 
point where there are no better materials to make your heads out of. Then it was realized 
that perpendicular recording would get you at least a factor of 2 in this problem, just 
because the geometry is better (the materials you can make it out of allow you to use 
smaller grains). Big deal with disk media group people- change of materials where data is 
stored but you’ve also got all this soft stuff and layers that are needed in order to 
complete the head. 
 
• 3rd big change- evolutionary- Electronics- changed from vacuum tubes to transistors to 
integrated circuits to million transistor integrated circuits and suddenly something as big 
as a refrigerator was now on a chip, and you can actually put it in a little disk drive 
instead of in a separate giant box. Evolutionary change- not a single product change like 
MR heads. If you wanted to point at something- 8” and 5.25” drives (because before that 
the disks were huge with giant control units)- huge shrinking in 1 product. Allowed a lot 
of new applications for disk drives, not just data center at the bank anymore. 
 
• More departments than you know. Tribology (science of corrosion and wear- deal with 
reliability)- head crash group- when they went from particulate disks (iron oxide- not 
very magnetic) to thin film disks- big change for them. They had to work really hard to 
come up with a way of lubricating a metal- once you go to metallic (iron oxides not very 
magnetic- went to thin film because they needed stronger magnets)- head crashes, nicks 
the protective coat on the disk and then corrodes (rust) the disk. When you went to an 
MR head, you not only had to lubricate it and keep it dry, but you also had to put in an 
insulating layer because when the head hit the disk, it was actually an electrical short and 
you can’t have that (used carbon overcoat had hard carbon, an insulator to protect MR 
heads from shorting out when they touch the disk). 
 
• Just like dreamliner- one thing affects other things. Lithium manganese cobalt battery- 
burns without energy (like a bomb). 
 
• Air bearing also in tribology department- wear-in process. Only the very first disk drive, 
the RAMAC, used an air bearing from a pump, all the others are self supported air 
bearings, which means they started contact, but as they get going the air being sucked 
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under the head builds up a little pressure and the head floats, but during starts and stops 
there’s lots of it, so you have to worry about the wear in that process. 
 
• In the old 100K drives, the company did everything, they built all the parts themselves- it 
was too complicated and there was no independent component business (Companies had 
to be totally VI-ed at first). 3 or 4 companies doing this. 
 
• After awhile, little firms popped up as component suppliers (making heads, disks, 
electronics, lubricants)- only existed in a stable evolutionary environment. When there 
was a big tech upheaval (like from particulate to thin film disks, half of them would go 
broke because they couldn’t do the integration testing and the development needed to 
make sure the heads and disks and electronics all worked together-these firms would not 
have enough R&D to make the new components) would go bust. 
 
• So you would see the big companies put out a standard technology. And after a few 
generations of that, people would start copying them, often staff hired away from the big 
companies, would either make cheaper drives using the same kind of technology or they 
would just make components and sell them to other people. Then a big changes, and half 
of those guys were gone- very tough on them. Couldn’t change technologies without 
being in bed with a disk company. 
 
• Continue to make old tech at low price, new tech very expensive development-wise- so 
even though new tech was better, they could compete for awhile and then sort of taper 
off. Once that new technology was established, they would reverse-engineer and hire 
people away to get the technology. Come out with equivalent product 1 or 2 generations 
later. 
 
• There are certain companies that buy disks and heads from other companies but they get 
closer and closer together until one of the drive companies just acquires them because 
they need stable supply and tight integration. 
 
• There’s 1 or 2 independent head companies left, and few drive companies at all (Seagate, 
Western Digital and Toshiba). 
 
• IBM as a matter of policy, you would buy 10% of your components from the outside just 
to keep your inside guys honest. But you’d have to buy enough to keep the little guy in 
business. 
 
• If technology reaches a dead end- can’t make disk any smaller because you can’t find the 
right materials to do it, then you might see component makers again, but only if there’s 
enough disk drive companies left to make it matter. But only 3 companies making drives 
anymore, which may not be enough to keep the independents alive. 
 
• Product development- the first thing you do is try to integrate all the components together 
on the bench (make new parts work with device) and put in test drive and work on the 
tribology. He always worked in research area but was called in enough times to product 
 79 
development to help them out of a hole- even if you know what you want, but the key is 
scaling up the production line. If you can make a few 1000 and they work perfectly, then 
you go to 1000/day and it all falls apart. Key to profit and reliability- get the 
manufacturing stuff right. 
 
• I can think of more examples of where we outsourced the assembly of the drive. You can 
outsource components if you can establish tests for the components and test them all the 
time (both at the supplier end and the receiving end). Can essentially use these suppliers 
then, but not easy.  Component suppliers managed the work with low overhead and quick 
turnaround (quick and lean), whereas big companies like IBM still had huge overhead. 
 
• Gave the component suppliers the key parameters (current and voltage, distance off disk, 
give them a few disks they can test with the heads)- write a whole set of specs.  
 
• Parts you made yourself didn’t always work, which was a major reason for having a 
second source. 
 
• Non-disclosure agreements- worried about whether component suppliers were sharing (if 
they were also supplying your competitors)- don’t want them to know what your specs 
are. IBM used component suppliers the least of all the major firms. 
 
• Did product come out faster if you did your own manufacturing? 
 
• Trying to ensure smooth flow of production- want other suppliers if there’s a hiccup in 
your factory. IBM had 3 factories making heads, if one went down, it was good to have 
some independent suppliers qualified to make that part. 
 
• Seagate started out using all outside suppliers, but gradually did it themselves because it’s 
much easier to develop a new product using in-house components. You know exactly 
what you’ve got. 
 
• Made first MR heads in 1970 and first working inductive heads in 1970s- recognized that 
MR heads not an obvious choice for HDD- with an inductive head, you get a voltage out 
that’s proportional to the rate at which bits go by (the velocity of the disk). With 
something like a tape drive, which is 100x lower velocity, the signal is a 100x smaller, 
the MR head doesn’t care, it’s independent of speed. Early heads were used for magnetic 
stripe cards at Macy’s to read price tags just like credit cards, sensing magnetic bubbles, 
tape drives much earlier. IBM made these- so very broad R&D and product placement. 
 
• Problem solving: That’s when you would use your broad R&D to decide what to use to 
give you transfer rate, capacity and reliability demanded. 
 
• With every tech change there were people who argued for keeping the old technology. 
Every time a new product cycle started, they’d name a product manager to talk to R&D 
for problem solving- manager would have to decide what to use after talking to R&D. So 
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example of a problem: too small of a signal, having trouble writing, need more capacity 
or reliability- MR heads were the answer. 
 
• MR heads were on the table for a long time before they were picked up. The product 
manager did not want to be the first guy to use a new technology, because it cost an 
enormous amount to do that, came out of his budget, cost to his profit, and lost reliability, 
took a long time to get this back.  
 
• R&D- Consultants to product developers, invented things on the side (MR heads and thin 
film inductive heads fell into this category). 
• Many people patent things that are dreamed up but that they cannot make! 
 
• By the time MR heads came out- patents were expiring for that tech. When you patent 
something, telling the world what you’re doing. If you know something will take a long 
time, so you’re torn- do you patent? What about coworkers who leave (could patent it at 
next company)? Can’t publish without patenting. Can patent things you can’t make. 
 
• Thin film inductive- a process more than knowledge and process patents were not 
enforceable (although did get a good patent out of that- patent the wrinkles that come out 
of the process- the shape of the little magnetic pole tips and the shape of the back of the 
thing- patent what you got out of the process- what was needed to make something work) 
 
• Printers, typewriters, machine guns (WWII), mechanical company with a mechanical 
background that grew into computers- invented the business computer, had to invent the 
disk drive, made some of the first tape drives- try to innovate based on what could be 
better/less expensive. Being exposed to all these industries enabled them to come up with 
different ways to solve problems.  
 
• Answer to thesis question: If breakthrough can be contained in 1 area, not as big a deal as 
multiple departments, need to be VI-ed if new component is not a drop in and multiple 
disciplines are involved. Need to know all the things they tried and didn’t work, so 
reverse engineering has its pitfalls too. 
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A.4 NOTES FROM INTERVIEW WITH INDUSTRY SOURCE 3- 1-25-13 
Industry Source 3 was formerly CTO at a large HDD firm (57,900 employees), and spent 27 
years at another large HDD firm (433,362 employees). All notes below are his specific 
comments on industry trends. 
 
• IBM: the issue wasn’t a technology problem, it was a culture- speed-business process 
problem 
 
• Clearly they had the technology development, IBM made huge investments in  research 
for magnetic recording and everything from components to electronics and interfaces, but 
the problem they had was that they really didn’t have a process for moving that advanced 
technology into products. 
 
• Some of it was culture. There were cultural barriers between R&D and product 
development. ___ can tell me something about that as well- since he worked at IBM 
research for a number of years, he can tell me about it from that side, but ___ has a view 
of it from the product development side. 
 
• IBM of course founded the industry, founded on it based on a business model that was 
focused on the enterprise business because only businesses could afford the price of the 
early disk drives. They built a huge huge business in enterprise and computers and disk 
drive systems and subsystems and they really struggled (and I’m sure you’ve read the 
Innovator’s Dilemma) when the PC business started- they fumbled that ball rather badly 
from both a software point of view and as well as from a hardware point of view. The 
enterprise business they had been so pre-eminent in for all those years was based on a 
business model that required huge margins- huge gross margins.  
 
• Their semiconductor business for example, was running at 70%+ gross margins,  their 
disk drive business was as well, and when small companies began and the PC market 
began to develop and their became a driving demand for low cost rotating storage, other 
companies didn’t have all this overhead and all this infrastructure and they could survive 
on a 20% gross margin instead of a 70% gross margin. 
 
• IBM kind of figured it out, though they had another problem- it was a centrally managed 
company- all the major decisions concerning investments and strategy came out of 
Armonk, and so the operating divisions couldn’t manage their businesses independently- 
everything had to go through Armonk for final approval make decisions. They had a 
business process and structure issue that just slowed them down so much, that they didn’t 
respond quickly enough even though they really could see it coming. It was fascinating to 
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watch and probably still have today one of the most sophisticated predictive capabilities 
in their organization in terms of where technologies are going, where the business is 
going, where the markets are going. They understand all of that, but just couldn’t make 
the transition fast enough. 
 
• So speed was a problem and that’s sort of the high level overview of the business and 
infrastructure issue that IBM was dealing with in the early 90s/late 80s. 
 
• They recognized that issue that they had. 
 
• Because IBM was pre-eminent in enterprise business and in the 50s, 60s and even 70s, 
there were no competitors- and so IBM’s answer to that was to set up different locations, 
different divisions, located in different parts of the country, and give a couple of those 
divisions the same responsibilities and had them effectively compete against each other 
for resources. (i.e. they set up a development organization in Rochester, Minnesota, for 
example, that had responsibility for low end disk drives, and left the responsibility for 
high end disk drives in San Jose). The idea was that the Rochester team would not have 
the cultural barriers or cultural issues and business issues- but the problem eventually was 
that they ran each independently for a short time, and eventually each of these 
independently run divisions was folded together into San Jose- they felt threatened and 
had control of the funds, so they squeezed off. Maybe not on purpose. 
 
• As the world changed, as the PC business got started, computers and the storage systems 
that went with them went from these highly unique systems in fairly low production to a 
commodities type business, where manufacturing was king in many ways. 
 
• What about the technology things going on in the industry? 
 
• MR heads, thin film heads and media- difficult technology transitions for the industry to 
make, but at the time, in the early days, IBM was very pre-eminent in those technologies, 
in terms of their research understanding. The problem they had was that they couldn’t 
translate that to product development. So there was this kind of cultural barrier between 
IBM research and product development that slowed the transition of technology from 
research into product development. One of the huge issues for the enterprise business was 
that reliability was king- using the new technology was a very dangerous thing. If you 
moved to a new technology too quickly into a product in the enterprise business and it 
was embryonic and had some kind of teething pains then you ended up populating 
enterprise systems with a problem that was going to be very very costly to fix. So there 
was a natural reluctance to new technology going rapidly from research to products. 
 
• Knew tech changes were coming but couldn’t move fast enough for 2 reasons: 1. 
reluctance on part of product development team to move these new technologies into the 
products, because they had a huge install base that required enormously mature 
technology, they wouldn’t risk putting an embryonic technology into the products 
because the business impact would be so great. At that particular time they were coming 
off of a very serious problem with particulate media- and even conventional heads- where 
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there was some kind of vapor in the manufacturing process that was changing the 
properties of the lubricant on the media, and they would get stuck heads in the field, so 
the customer would shut the drive down, and restart, or when they went to restart, it 
would rip the heads off the suspension- so this was at about the same time that the 
industry was transitioning to thin film media and thin film heads. So the product 
development team was exceedingly worried about moving new technology very rapidly 
for fear of creating another hugely expensive- and this was hundreds of millions of 
dollars to fix that problem with the sticking heads. The industry struggled with this as 
well. (2) Cultural divide between IBM research and product development. IBM research 
folks had been run very very independently, they had independent funding, they worked 
on whatever they wanted to work on, and IBM figured out that they really needed to take 
advantage of that great resource in IBM research, and so they began to assign IBM 
research members to product development teams to build a pipeline of translation from 
IBM research development into  product development. That helped, but it was too little 
too late. And it took a while for the research team- many of them didn’t really want to 
work on product development. And there was a little bit of arrogance on the side of the 
IBM research team as well. Product development folks made to feel like second-class 
citizens. 
 
• IBM had the technology but just couldn’t move it quickly into the product side, and the 
big difference was, they had a different market than the PC market. The PC market folks- 
the Seagates of the world, the Maxtors, the Apples- all of those folks were, as the 
Innovators Dilemma points out, they were all focused on a new market that would 
tolerate some missteps and miss-starts and some technology issues in exchange for low 
cost 
 
• Part of the cost structure of IBM was proving a new technology was indeed very reliable- 
so they would build hundreds of hundreds of expensive devices to make sure they 
weren’t introducing and immature technology into the enterprise business. So that’s the 
kind of barrier that prevented the leader in the technology development from a research 
point of view from transitioning technologies quickly into products. 
 
• Thin film head transition came at a time before or simultaneously with the embryonic 
development of the PC business. So thin film heads and thin film head media were just 
transitioning at that time, so that’s a time when IBM was living that problem (would have 
had to test the new tech in enterprise systems first). 
 
• MR heads actually got introduced first in IBM in the low end of the business (he was the 
product development manager at the time for that). It was introduced in a product called 
Corsair which is a 3.5” 8 disk stack disk drive- standard form factors. So IBM’s 
introduction of MR heads into disk drives to the world actually happened in lower end 
business. Not necessarily PCs but intermediate systems and then PCs came a bit later. By 
the time PCs were there, IBM was building disk drives in Japan, trying to get the low cost 
structure to solve this margin problem that I described before, and they were building 
5.25” and 3.5” disk drives with older, Winchester technology in Japan for the internal 
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PCs. The other issues IBM had was that anything that was made internal was kept 
internal, had trouble being willing to sell their technology 
 
• Totally vertically integrated, couldn’t get economies of scale in manufacturing without 
selling low end disk drives to other folks, other companies. So the economies of scale did 
not come as quickly to IBM as it did for other folks. 
 
• They started out- not selling into the OEM business. The 5.25” disk drives were 
developed for internal IBM system platforms, as well as the 3.5” disk drives, and those 
divisions were not allowed to OEM those devices. So IBM was protecting their 
technology by not selling it to other companies. They were trying to protect their PC 
business, for example, by only allowing Fujisawa, Japan to ship disk drives for IBM PCs, 
wouldn’t let them sell them to HP or Atari or anyone else in the early days. They finally 
changed that but it was again too late. This gets back to everything getting driven out of 
Armonk, so these were strategic decisions that were made at the company but the 
decisions came too late. The decision to participate in the OEM market as a supplier of 
components came too late. It allowed the myriad of other disk drive developers and 
manufacturers to get a strong foothold because IBM could not get their cost structure 
under control fast enough. 
 
• Other firms supplied IBM when IBM could not address their own demand. The PC 
market grew faster than anyone anticipated- 
 
• PC business- set up as an independent company, and removed the barriers of requiring 
them to buy only internal components- first division within IBM to remove VI 
requirement. Their source was wherever they could get the lowest price components, 
whether it was disk drives or silicon, whatever. Of course the Fujisawa folks then had to 
compete on an OEM basis- smart thing to do but they did it a little too late. So it put 
Fujisawa Japan on the same footing as the OEM suppliers and forced the portion of IBM 
how to figure out how to behave in a much more cost effective way, both from a product 
development perspective as well as a manufacturing point of view. 
 
• I really think that the long term strategists could see the emergence of the PC market 
pretty early. In fact IBM did a machine called the 5100 which was a basic ATL machine 
that weighed 50 lbs and would fit underneath the seat of an airplane, but that was really 
the first commercial portable computer. Albeit not very portable in today’s standards. But 
that came before PCs. SO IBM could see this coming and set up PC business as an 
independent company because they could see it coming. They saw it coming but they just 
couldn’t react fast enough. Of course the margins in the PC business got- they went from 
20% to 5% as many many new companies got involved in it. 
 
• Margins were not there for new markets to make it worth entering. They exited disk drive 
business eventually for that reason- because the margins were not there. And they said- 
this was all part of a major transformation of IBM from a major vertically integrated 
company focused on hardware to a sales and services kind of company, with software. 
IBM made this huge huge transition, in the 90s, driven by the fact that they just couldn’t 
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manage the low margins, couldn’t survive in that world, so they changed the direction of 
the company in a profound way, and I’m convinced that they would have failed if they 
hadn’t done that. It’s unusual for a company as old as it was at the time, 70-80 years old 
at the time, to make this huge transition, and its business model, driving 400,000 people 
in a new direction. So again a result of IBM being able to look at the future pretty well, 
they just realized that they were never going to get their cost structure to the point where 
they could survive the low margins in the PC business, so they decided to exit it and go in 
a new direction. 
 
• He thinks they moved into the PC business thinking that margins were going to be x%, 
and they ended up being x-20% or something like that 
 
• High volume commodity business- IBM didn’t understand. They didn’t think they 
thought the PC business was going to become so commoditized with the resulting margin 
erosion that happened. Once they figured that out, they just got out, closed the business 
down. 
 
• Emerging technology- there are early adopters and the volumes are low. Which is why 
big companies like IBM will move late into a market. It’s a matter of scale, so in the early 
days- IBM didn’t think it was worth going after 3.5”, 5.25” disk drives. I remember the 
discussions- “oh, there’s not going to be enough volume there. There’s an arrogance in 
the enterprise, high end disk drive business that the 5.25” drives were second rate and 
didn’t have the reliability that was needed, they were never going to make it. 
 
• For small startups, what seemed small to IBM (50K units/yr or even 10K/yr) was a big 
deal to a startup. Seagate was Al Shugart in a garage. Able to grow their infrastructure 
and scale it as the business grew (didn’t have millions of dollars in salaries to pay every 
year), whereas IBM and other big firms like Imprimis started with a huge amount of 
overhead and just didn’t think this low end was going to grow as quickly as it did. 
 
• Those startups decided to become component (disk drive is component in a system) 
suppliers (i.e. Conner Peripherals, early Seagate)- bought parts wherever they could buy 
them, were buying from old CDC- Winchester heads from CDC in those very early days. 
PCs at the time using tape drives- so even 1 MB of rotating storage in HDD was a huge 
improvement over tape. I can remember the early PCs that ran on tape drives, the big deal 
was the next generation that came out with a disk drive, and it was very expensive 
compared to tape. And as soon as the scale began to develop, there were the early 
adopters who would purchase the early rotating drive PCs, as those grew in volume and 
costs began to decline and economies of scale came into play, the 5.25” disk drive just 
dropped dramatically until it displaced the tape drives. 
 
• i.e. Conner Peripherals supplying disk drives as a supplier to H-P for PCs- the big system 
houses like H-P would be trying to enter a new market, like a notebook, so they would go 
back to the drive supplier, in this case, Conner Peripherals, asking for a smaller drive, 
they were going to scale down the size of a computer to the point where it can become 
even more portable so I need a smaller disk drive. (NOTE: they found out about the new 
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markets from their customers (H-P) who wanted to make a laptop or notebook or 
whatever). The other thing that happened of course was the areal density was doubling 
every 12-18 months, so the capacity of a disk drive soon outpaced the needs of a very low 
end entry level computer, and so the size and power requirements of the silicon was 
dropping at the same Moore’s Law rate, so it became obvious to many people that if you 
project that into the future who thought notebooks would be possible, even if a whole 
bunch of people did not think the market would be anything. Same argument people used 
when the markets for PC started- low level, entry-level device has a- only meets a modest 
set of requirements but it’s enough to get it started. 
 
• The system houses that were looking to do notebooks or whatever emerging markets 
would go to their supplier and ask for smaller drives. Then Maxtor’s (or whoever’s) 
marketing people would go back to product developers and see if it was possible and start 
a new business line. 
 
• The folks at Seagate slow at this- Conner much better (did early 2.5” drives)- bought 
Conner (and it’s 2.5” disk drive business) to solve this problem of late market entry. 
 
• These startup companies had very little advanced technology work- were pretty market-
driven. They’d wait for someone to ask them for something smaller. Margins were so 
low- they couldn’t afford the R&D unless they know the market is there. Seagate was a 
very large company when 2.5” business started, Conner was a startup (first product was 
2.5” drive)- Innovator’s Dilemma type thing where new startup came in at very low end 
and established company was late to come to market. The reason it happens, in the 
generic sense is that lots of startups (9 out of 10) fail- because they picked the wrong 
market, usually. 
 
• So Conner Peripherals was the 1/10 that survived this vetting process that the market 
superimposes on startups. 
 
• Head media, silicon- what the startups really did was (Seagate, Conner Peripherals, etc.) 
became technologies integrators instead of innovators, used component suppliers who 
copied innovations. 
 
• The first Seagate drives were Winchester technology- were able to buy ferrite heads at 
low cost because the production lines were already amortized, already paid for, so 
companies were willing to sell ferrite heads at low cost because they weren’t making any 
capital investments in the manufacturing process (industry was transitioning to thin film) 
so they were just sort of milking old manufacturing technology and ferrite technology. 
Seagate purchased their heads from Imprimis (CDC at the time) who copied IBM’s 
Winchester technology for their disk drives. So those ferrite heads were available in the 
marketplace. A couple of firms making particulate media- in this case for CDC’s drives- 
so the evolution of the media industry was a little bit different. CDC made its own media 
for awhile but also began to buy outside. The particulate media was available to Seagate 
as well, and they would buy silicon from all the silicon suppliers. Unlike the VI-ed IBM, 
who developed the technology and manufacturing processes for all those technologies. 
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• Used old tech first in the emerging markets- as markets matured- would use newer 
technology as suppliers were able to copy it. 
 
• When IBM introduced first MR heads into 3.5” disk drive business, they were never able 
to capitalize on it because they had a too high-cost infrastructure. So as MR heads 
became available from companies like Read Rite- later than IBM- significant amount of 
time- 3 years or more, might even be 5- because it was a very difficult technology. But 
IBM at the time would not sell its MR heads to anyone- Seagate even approached IBM to 
purchase MR heads and IBM said no. 
 
• Flaw in IBM’s thinking- unwillingness to participate in OEM business at any level- disk 
drive or component level- was a major error. IBM would not supply any components to 
the other HDD firms- wanted to protect their IP- but someone could reverse engineer the 
technology. So protecting your IP that way is fleeting- doesn’t last very long. 
 
• It got to be a thing of scale- why was Read Rite successful? At some point in time their 
production surpassed that of IBM by a significant amount. So economies of scale in 
manufacturing began to play heavily into the equation. 
 
• Seagate (so small they had no choice) started as an integrator- very little technology they 
put in themselves- bought head, disk, silicon, motor, actuator, put a little electronics on it, 
minimalistic control on drive- control was from computer itself- STL-05 control in early 
days. Very first 5.25” drives in the market from Seagate had this very low level interface. 
Did a little bit of engineering to hold things together, a little engineering on actuators, put 
very simplistic electronics on it that would interface to the computer and the computer 
controlled the drive. Very simple interface. Mature technology for ferrite heads, and for 
oxide media, for read write electronics, head suspensions, motor technology (although 
this was one of the things Seagate moved in early on because in those days the motors 
were pre-embryonic and not very developed yet for those small drives). 
 
• Think of the startup disk drive companies for the 5.25” and the 2.5” as component 
integrators, that’s really the service they provided. They did no component development, 
if they needed a read-write head, they went to the silicon house and had them design it. 
They would wait for the next generation head or the next generation media technology. 
The media companies were working on, how do I get a better oxide media? How do I 
polish the surface to reduce the fly height, so the sort of thing that happened next was that 
the Seagates became systems integrators but began to develop really tightly coupled 
relationships with the component suppliers. Seagate would share test results of number of 
start-stop failures, because they would do the system testing of these components. Long 
term flyability testing would get done by the Seagates and the Conners. Not with the rigor 
that IBM did with its enterprise business but enough to get the reliability good enough to 
manage the entry level emerging markets. That’s the way that business evolved. Western 
Digital came along at some later time, there was a whole set of media and head 
manufacturing companies that grew and evolved around these disk drive integration 
companies like Seagate and Conner, and Western Digital. 
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• Component suppliers did not work together, company like Seagate would source current 
production from several, maybe 3, head suppliers. So as the component suppliers made 
the transition from ferrite heads to thin film heads, and then the big difficult jump to MR 
heads took 5 years (which is actually not that bad- couldn’t have done it any faster)- 
Seagate would provide a test bed- did the system integration coordination. 
 
• The MR heads required totally different set of electronics to drive it, the amplifiers and 
write drivers were seriously different and had to account for some pretty challenging 
issues with MR heads in early days- so Seagates of the world would be the coordinator of 
that technology. So they would figure out some of the anomalies in the MR head for 
example and go back to the supplier with the right electronics and say “I need this to be 
current sourced in this way, I need the read amplifier to be able to overlook a certain kind 
of noise, so there was that kind of system integration, a very technical system integration 
function that was provided by companies like Seagate, Maxtor and Western Digital. 
 
• Would have to expend more R&D dollars (which was actually spread over many firms, 
since all Seagate and firms like it would do research on systems integration outsourced 
parts, the component suppliers would do their own research on each individual part) at 
that time- those who chose not to do this were not able to stay in the business. They 
couldn’t beat time to market by waiting for someone else to do systems integration, 
they’d be waiting too long. 
 
• There were also back channels where information leaked from the first movers (IBM)- 
people would move from 1 firm to another and take the info with them, IBM would 
sometimes litigate, but it was already out. 
 
• The 20 years IBM took to develop MR heads was to develop EVERYTHING. It took 5 
years for enough info to leak out of IBM and enough infrastructure and development to 
happen at outside companies like the Seagates and the component suppliers, but the 
reason it was 5 years instead of 20 is that there was an awful lot of technology that IBM 
developed that ended up leaking. Given the challenges involved in incorporating the MR 
head- 5 years not bad. 
 
• Tom was the IBM product development manager of Corsair- the first HDD product to use 
MR heads. Integration was incredibly difficult and took a lot longer than it was supposed 
to. Given those challenges in integrating MR heads vs. thin film heads, 5 years isn’t 
terribly long, especially in that time frame. 
 
• If someone did not invest in their own R&D on integration, they wouldn’t have survived- 
they would either run out of money or they would have shipped something with a major 
problem into the marketplace and the market would have taken them out. Several 
companies failed making that MR head transition. 
 
• Broader R&D gives you a better chance of picking the right technology. 
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• In 1997, he went to Seagate- after IBM had cut drive business back dramatically, had cut 
funding IBM R&D (especially for disk drives)- IBM was in the throes of transitioning 
from a WI business into a services and software business. Al Shugart (Seagate founder) 
said that IBM was essentially getting out of the disk drive business, they’ve cut research 
dramatically if a US firm doesn’t make a major investment in HDD research, particularly 
in component research in a major way, they will lose the entire business to the Far East. 
 
• His job was to set up a research organization within Seagate (which Mark eventually 
headed) to replace what was leaving at IBM as they exited disk drive research. This was 
all based on Al Shugart saying that you needed to be VI-ed to succeed in this business 
and do R&D to keep the industry in the US. 
 
• In technology industries, you have to make investments in research. 
 
• The way he responded to Al was yes I’ll take the job, need to find someone to head the 
research organization. 
 
• Last point: He had to find someone to lead R&D on Seagate- at the time, spending was 
very low on long-range R&D (less than 1% on R&D that would take more than 2 years). 
They increased spending 20% on R&D that would take longer than 5 years, 10% increase 
in spending on R&D that would take 2-5 years (to create an innovation pipeline) and the 
rest on advanced technological development (who took R&D output and transitioned it to 
product development).  Shut down a few design centers to pay for research. This is why 
Seagate grew so much while ___ was there (his budget was $50mm while he was there).  
 
• Wasn’t that difficult as it seems because they had purchased Imprimis and Conner 
Peripherals so they had 3 different product development teams but they never integrated 
those together. Even things as fundamental as to which way should a disk spin was 
different in each one, so they formed a platform strategy to leverage head platforms and 
disk platforms and drive platforms, and silicon platforms (like auto industry does).  
 
• Customer interface side didn’t change as a result of this. Example of a failure in a sense 
was that there was a set of thinking, particularly at Seagate, due to focus on 5 year and 10 
year horizons, and people felt that there would need to be a need for smaller and smaller 
drives so they started to do work on 1.8” drives. But they didn’t anticipate other 
technologies (moving as fast in silicon areal density increases as it did in drive business- 
wasn’t long before you could use flash in a cell phone or a camera), like flash, replacing 
them. Can get blindsided if you don’t truly understand where your competition is coming 
from in the future, even though the tech is moving in parallel. 
 
• Both he and ___ think that they’ll move from flash back to disk drives over the next 10 
years. 
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A.5 INTERVIEWEES’ CHARACTERIZATIONS OF DIFFERENT 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
Technology 
change 
Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 
MR heads 1. “2 companies that did MR 
head technology (IBM and 
HP) did tech for MR head- 
IBM version was reverse 
engineered by the rest of the 
industry (they waited for 
product to come out, took it 
apart- spent 2-3 years before 
they mastered the tech and 
they could commercialize 
MR heads.” 
 
2. “H-P chose not to make its 
own technology- chose to use 
Headway in California- 
outsourced to Komag affiliate 
Headway- made wafers. 
Established a 3 way 
partnership- H-P, Seagate, 
and Headway. Headway 
(later purchased by TDK- 
only head maker around 
today) made wafers, H-P 
provided technology. Seagate 
then took the wafers, did 
HGA, kept some for itself, 
gave rest to H-P. During this 
process, Seagate learned to 
make the MR heads by 
watching Headway 
(benefited from 20 yrs of 
research at H-P).” 
1. “During the evolution, there were 
lots and lots of changes: 3 big 
changes: 1. change from a particulate 
disk (paint) to thin film disk media 2. 
change from conventional recording 
head to a MR (magneto resistive) head 
3. change from giant control units to a 
small, relatively compact circuit 
electronics thing you put on the 
drive.” 
 
2. “my own specialty: thin film head 
and originally it was a regular 
magnetic conductor thin film head, 
although he started working on both of 
them in 1969 or so, 1970. So as far as 
I’m concerned, the thin film head, and 
the inductive head and the MR head 
are at pretty much the same time, but 
from a product point of view, MR 
head took 20 years (came out in 
1991), thin film inductive heads was 
much earlier, at least 10 years earlier.” 
 
3. “The reason that the MR head was a 
bigger change than the thin film head 
was because the thin film head, in 
some sense, was a drop-in 
replacement for the previous inductive 
head, which is a ferrite head, which is 
pretty much a drop in replacement for 
the original metal head. If you showed 
someone who worked on the original 
heads and you showed them the ferrite 
head which was a magnetic material 
and smaller, and then you showed 
them the thin film head, well, we got 
rid of the ladies with the needles who 
were trying to wind wire around an 
infinitesimal gizmo and replaced it 
with thin film fabrication techniques. 
But they’re all essentially the same, so 
there’s no trouble- if you understood 
one, you would have no trouble 
understanding the other. And the MR 
head, of course, was a different animal 
entirely.” 
1. “MR heads, thin film heads and 
media- difficult technology 
transitions for the industry to 
make, but at the time, in the early 
days, IBM was very pre-eminent 
in those technologies, in terms of 
their research understanding. The 
problem they had was that they 
couldn’t translate that to product 
development. So there was this 
kind of cultural barrier between 
IBM research and product 
development that slowed the 
transition of technology from 
research into product 
development. One of the huge 
issues for the enterprise business 
was that reliability was king- 
using the new technology was a 
very dangerous thing. If you 
moved to a new technology too 
quickly into a product in the 
enterprise business and it was 
embryonic and had some kind of 
teething pains then you ended up 
populating enterprise systems 
with a problem that was going to 
be very very costly to fix. So 
there was a natural reluctance to 
new technology going rapidly 
from research to products.” 
 
2. “MR heads actually got 
introduced first in IBM in the low 
end of the business (he was the 
product development manager at 
the time for that). It was 
introduced in a product called 
Corsair which is a 3.5” 8 disk 
stack disk drive- standard form 
factors. So IBM’s introduction of 
MR heads into disk drives to the 
world actually happened in lower 
end business. Not necessarily PCs 
but intermediate systems and then 
PCs came a bit later. By the time 
PCs were there, IBM was 
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4. “I used to give the newcomers a 
kind of little lecture on why the MR 
head turned everything upside down. 
Previous heads, when you went from 
one generation to another, was a big 
deal in head department, and you also 
had to talk to the guys who had to 
decide what voltage of currents to run 
through it, but other than that, they’re 
all pretty much the same, they affected 
mostly the head department. When we 
went to the MR head, we had to 
change of course, the head 
department, change the disk, because, 
well I can tell you why, but we had to 
coat the disk. We had to change the 
electronics, the equalization as it’s 
called- the signal was different. We 
had to change the servo dept because 
up until that time, the same recording 
head wrote the track and read it (a 
single head device). But an MR head 
only reads, so you had to build it with 
an inductive head stuck on top of it. 
And since they’re never exactly in the 
same alignment, you had to get the 
servo people to switch a little bit of 
track switch every time you switched 
between reading and writing, partly a 
big deal because by that time, even 
when you were writing, between that 
receptor you had to read the servo 
information which tells you where the 
head is positioned. So it changed all of 
that. Then you also had potential 
corrosion problems, so the people who 
were in charge of the atmosphere 
within the drive had to change what 
they were doing and then there was 
endless testing, and it turns out these 
heads were susceptible to electrostatic 
charge, static zap. So if the ladies 
wiggle their butt on the chair and get 
an electrostatic charge while 
assembling drive, it would blow up 
the head.  So there was a whole new 
testing regime, a whole new 
manufacturing procedure. If I think 
about it more I’ll probably come up 
with other departments that were 
affected. But the short answer is, 
changing from a thin film to an 
inductive head was small potatoes 
compared to affecting everybody 
when you went to an MR head, and 
building disk drives in Japan, 
trying to get the low cost structure 
to solve this margin problem that 
I described before, and they were 
building 5.25” and 3.5” disk 
drives with older, Winchester 
technology in Japan for the 
internal PCs. The other issues 
IBM had was that anything that 
was made internal was kept 
internal, had trouble being willing 
to sell their technology.” 
 
3. “When IBM introduced first 
MR heads into 3.5” disk drive 
business, they were never able to 
capitalize on it because they had a 
too high-cost infrastructure. So as 
MR heads became available from 
companies like Read Rite- later 
than IBM- significant amount of 
time- 3 years or more, might even 
be 5- because it was a very 
difficult technology. But IBM at 
the time would not sell its MR 
heads to anyone- Seagate even 
approached IBM to purchase MR 
heads and IBM said no.” 
 
4. “Component suppliers did not 
work together, company like 
Seagate would source current 
production from several, maybe 
3, head suppliers. So as the 
component suppliers made the 
transition from ferrite heads to 
thin film heads, and then the big 
difficult jump to MR heads took 5 
years (which is actually not that 
bad- couldn’t have done it any 
faster)- Seagate would provide a 
test bed- did the system 
integration coordination. 
 
5. “The MR heads required totally 
different set of electronics to 
drive it, the amplifiers and write 
drivers were seriously different 
and had to account for some 
pretty challenging issues with MR 
heads in early days- so Seagates 
of the world would be the 
coordinator of that technology. So 
they would figure out some of the 
anomalies in the MR head for 
example and go back to the 
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that’s one of the reasons why the 
industry lagged behind a while.” 
 
5. “Here’s another example: in a disk 
drive of those days, probably even still 
today, there are inevitable contacts 
between the heads and the disks. 
Because you just can’t make a disk 
smooth enough, because you’re flying 
so close, you could never get a speck 
of dust in there, but even so, any little 
ripple on the disk touches the head, 
and didn’t affect the inductive head 
except it might wear it, but an MR 
head was thermo transient (drove 
electronics crazy), so there was a long 
and difficult set of work in the 
electronics side and in the channel 
side, to deal with the thermo-
transience. So they just didn’t exist 
before that. Imperfections on the disk 
when head goes by, it actually 
mechanically touched, it didn’t have 
to be a magnetic particle it touched, 
often it was just a speck of something 
that was there in the disk 
manufacturing process, but as it went 
by the head, it caused a little thermo 
blip indistinguishable from a magnetic 
blip, so it drove the channel crazy.” 
 
6. “So all the air bearing people and 
wear and reliability people had to 
worry about that, but they knew what 
their orders were. But the MR head 
was a new set of orders. In addition to 
all of that, there was more.” 
 
7. “When you went to an MR head, 
you not only had to lubricate it and 
keep it dry, but you also had to put in 
an insulating layer because when the 
head hit the disk, it was actually an 
electrical short and you can’t have that 
(used carbon overcoat had hard 
carbon, an insulator to protect MR 
heads from shorting out when they 
touch the disk).” 
 
8. Made first MR heads in 1970 and 
first working inductive heads in 
1970s- recognized that MR heads not 
an obvious choice for HDD- with an 
inductive head, you get a voltage out 
that’s proportional to the rate at which 
bits go by (the velocity of the disk). 
supplier with the right electronics 
and say “I need this to be current 
sourced in this way, I need the 
read amplifier to be able to 
overlook a certain kind of noise, 
so there was that kind of system 
integration, a very technical 
system integration function that 
was provided by companies like 
Seagate, Maxtor and Western 
Digital.” 
 
6. “The 20 years IBM took to 
develop MR heads was to develop 
EVERYTHING. It took 5 years 
for enough info to leak out of 
IBM and enough infrastructure 
and development to happen at 
outside companies like the 
Seagates and the component 
suppliers, but the reason it was 5 
years instead of 20 is that there 
was an awful lot of technology 
that IBM developed that ended up 
leaking. Given the challenges 
involved in incorporating the MR 
head- 5 years not bad. 
 
7. “Tom was the IBM product 
development manager of Corsair- 
the first HDD product to use MR 
heads. Integration was incredibly 
difficult and took a lot longer than 
it was supposed to. Given those 
challenges in integrating MR 
heads vs. thin film heads, 5 years 
isn’t terribly long, especially in 
that time frame.” 
 
8. “If someone did not invest in 
their own R&D on integration, 
they wouldn’t have survived- they 
would either run out of money or 
they would have shipped 
something with a major problem 
into the marketplace and the 
market would have taken them 
out. Several companies failed 
making that MR head transition.” 
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With something like a tape drive, 
which is 100x lower velocity, the 
signal is a 100x smaller, the MR head 
doesn’t care, it’s independent of 
speed. Early heads were used for 
magnetic stripe cards at Macy’s to 
read price tags just like credit cards, 
sensing magnetic bubbles, tape drives 
much earlier. IBM made these- so 
very broad R&D and product 
placement. Problem solving: That’s 
when you would use your broad R&D 
to decide what to use to give you 
transfer rate, capacity and reliability 
demanded.” 
 
9. “With every tech change there were 
people who argued for keeping the old 
technology. Every time a new product 
cycle started, they’d name a product 
manager to talk to R&D for problem 
solving- manager would have to 
decide what to use after talking to 
R&D. So example of a problem: too 
small of a signal, having trouble 
writing, need more capacity or 
reliability- MR heads were the 
answer.” 
 
10. “MR heads were on the table for a 
long time before they were picked up. 
The product manager did not want to 
be the first guy to use a new 
technology, because it cost an 
enormous amount to do that, came out 
of his budget, cost to his profit, and 
lost reliability, took a long time to get 
this back.” 
 
11. “R&D- Consultants to product 
developers, invented things on the side 
(MR heads and thin film inductive 
heads fell into this category).” 
12. “By the time MR heads came out- 
patents were expiring for that tech. 
When you patent something, telling 
the world what you’re doing. If you 
know something will take a long time, 
so you’re torn- do you patent? What 
about coworkers who leave (could 
patent it at next company)? Can’t 
publish without patenting. Can patent 
things you can’t make.” 
Thin Film 
Media 
“IBM was late on film disk- 
even though they’d been 
working on it since mid- 
1. “During the evolution, there were 
lots and lots of changes: 3 big 
changes: 1. change from a particulate 
1. “Knew tech changes were 
coming but couldn’t move fast 
enough for 2 reasons: 1. 
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1960s- but were late- it was 
introduced by another firm in 
1983, was not introduced by 
IBM in 1988.” 
disk (paint) to thin film disk media 2. 
change from conventional recording 
head to a MR (magneto resistive) head 
3. change from giant control units to a 
small, relatively compact circuit 
electronics thing you put on the 
drive.” 
 
2. “There was one major evolutionary 
change- the thin film disk- to get rid of 
the paint, and that was very difficult 
for the disk people and the reliability 
people who had to worry about 
lubricating and wear and so forth, but 
it didn’t affect the other departments 
very much.” 
 
3. “More departments than you know. 
Tribology (science of corrosion and 
wear- deal with reliability)- head crash 
group- when they went from 
particulate disks (iron oxide- not very 
magnetic) to thin film disks- big 
change for them. They had to work 
really hard to come up with a way of 
lubricating a metal- once you go to 
metallic (iron oxides not very 
magnetic- went to thin film because 
they needed stronger magnets)- head 
crashes, nicks the protective coat on 
the disk and then corrodes (rust) the 
disk.” 
reluctance on part of product 
development team to move these 
new technologies into the 
products, because they had a huge 
install base that required 
enormously mature technology, 
they wouldn’t risk putting an 
embryonic technology into the 
products because the business 
impact would be so great. At that 
particular time they were coming 
off of a very serious problem with 
particulate media- and even 
conventional heads- where there 
was some kind of vapor in the 
manufacturing process that was 
changing the properties of the 
lubricant on the media, and they 
would get stuck heads in the field, 
so the customer would shut the 
drive down, and restart, or when 
they went to restart, it would rip 
the heads off the suspension- so 
this was at about the same time 
that the industry was transitioning 
to thin film media and thin film 
heads. So the product 
development team was 
exceedingly worried about 
moving new technology very 
rapidly for fear of creating 
another hugely expensive- and 
this was hundreds of millions of 
dollars to fix that problem with 
the sticking heads. The industry 
struggled with this as well. (2) 
Cultural divide between IBM 
research and product 
development. IBM research folks 
had been run very very 
independently, they had 
independent funding, they worked 
on whatever they wanted to work 
on, and IBM figured out that they 
really needed to take advantage of 
that great resource in IBM 
research, and so they began to 
assign IBM research members to 
product development teams to 
build a pipeline of translation 
from IBM research development 
into  product development. That 
helped, but it was too little too 
late. And it took a while for the 
research team- many of them 
didn’t really want to work on 
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product development. And there 
was a little bit of arrogance on the 
side of the IBM research team as 
well. Product development folks 
made to feel like second-class 
citizens.” 
Thin Film 
Inductive 
Heads 
 1. “my own specialty: thin film head 
and originally it was a regular 
magnetic conductor thin film head, 
although he started working on both of 
them in 1969 or so, 1970. So as far as 
I’m concerned, the thin film head, and 
the  inductive head and the MR head 
are at pretty much the same time, but 
from a product point of view, MR 
head took 20 years (came out in 
1991), thin film inductive heads was 
much earlier, at least 10 years earlier.” 
 
2. “R&D- Consultants to product 
developers, invented things on the side 
(MR heads and thin film inductive 
heads fell into this category).” 
 
3. “Thin film inductive- a process 
more than knowledge and process 
patents were not enforceable (although 
did get a good patent out of that- 
patent the wrinkles that come out of 
the process- the shape of the little 
magnetic pole tips and the shape of 
the back of the thing- patent what you 
got out of the process- what was 
needed to make something work)” 
1. “Knew tech changes were 
coming but couldn’t move fast 
enough for 2 reasons: 1. 
reluctance on part of product 
development team to move these 
new technologies into the 
products, because they had a huge 
install base that required 
enormously mature technology, 
they wouldn’t risk putting an 
embryonic technology into the 
products because the business 
impact would be so great. At that 
particular time they were coming 
off of a very serious problem with 
particulate media- and even 
conventional heads- where there 
was some kind of vapor in the 
manufacturing process that was 
changing the properties of the 
lubricant on the media, and they 
would get stuck heads in the field, 
so the customer would shut the 
drive down, and restart, or when 
they went to restart, it would rip 
the heads off the suspension- so 
this was at about the same time 
that the industry was transitioning 
to thin film media and thin film 
heads. So the product 
development team was 
exceedingly worried about 
moving new technology very 
rapidly for fear of creating 
another hugely expensive- and 
this was hundreds of millions of 
dollars to fix that problem with 
the sticking heads. The industry 
struggled with this as well. (2) 
Cultural divide between IBM 
research and product 
development. IBM research folks 
had been run very very 
independently, they had 
independent funding, they worked 
on whatever they wanted to work 
on, and IBM figured out that they 
really needed to take advantage of 
that great resource in IBM 
research, and so they began to 
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assign IBM research members to 
product development teams to 
build a pipeline of translation 
from IBM research development 
into  product development. That 
helped, but it was too little too 
late. And it took a while for the 
research team- many of them 
didn’t really want to work on 
product development. And there 
was a little bit of arrogance on the 
side of the IBM research team as 
well. Product development folks 
made to feel like second-class 
citizens.” 
 
2. “Thin film head transition 
came at a time before or 
simultaneously with the 
embryonic development of the PC 
business. So thin film heads and 
thin film head media were just 
transitioning at that time, so that’s 
a time when IBM was living that 
problem (would have had to test 
the new tech in enterprise systems 
first).” 
Form factor 
changes 
1. “Differences among 
companies in recognizing 
new markets: i.e. Seagate 
saw IBM PC as a market, 
even though IBM did not, 
Integral Peripherals saw 
mobile opportunity.” 
 
2.“Usually new 
entrants/startups found the 
market for new form factors- 
then big firms entered when 
it got big enough. Only after 
they demonstrated that these 
moves were significant did 
established firms move to 
offer that product as well.” 
 
3. “Latecomers made it to the 
market eventually (IBM was 
a latecomer to mobile market, 
but still got 50% of the 
market when they entered)- 
but even with successive 
changes, firms had trouble 
judging what markets to go 
into. 2 instances where IBM 
pioneered- RAMAC and the 
microdrive which had a short 
1. “Form factors: every new 
generation of disk drives shrank the 
components inside them. If you 
wanted to cut the loop on the areal 
density, you had to cut the track length 
in half and the bit length in half, and 
in the early days, you didn’t want a 
time, you first cut the track, and put 
out a generation of drives with twice 
the capacity. And then you put twice 
as many bits per inch along the track 
and that would be the next generation. 
Then you would go back to having the 
tracks again. And each time you do 
that, you have to make the magnetic 
grains on the disk had to be finer to 
keep the signal from getting read, you 
made the gap in head narrower to get 
more BPI along it. You had to make 
the width of the head half so you 
could get twice as many tracks per 
inch. But those were just evolutionary 
and they went on for many years. 
Everyone knew what their job was, 
you would have a smaller signal so 
you had to do something to filter out 
the noise. If you were increasing the 
linear density you had to fly closer by 
a factor of 2. So all the air bearing 
1. “IBM kind of figured it out, 
though they had another problem- 
it was a centrally managed 
company- all the major decisions 
concerning investments and 
strategy came out of Armonk, and 
so the operating divisions 
couldn’t manage their businesses 
independently- everything had to 
go through Armonk for final 
approval make decisions. They 
had a business process and 
structure issue that just slowed 
them down so much, that they 
didn’t respond quickly enough 
even though they really could see 
it coming. It was fascinating to 
watch and probably still have 
today one of the most 
sophisticated predictive 
capabilities in their organization 
in terms of where technologies 
are going, where the business is 
going, where the markets are 
going. They understand all of 
that, but just couldn’t make the 
transition fast enough.” 
 
2. “So speed was a problem and 
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life towards the end of the 
time they were in the 
industry- everything else they 
waited for others to pioneer.” 
people and wear and reliability people 
had to worry about that, but they knew 
what their orders were.” 
 
2. “3rd big change- evolutionary- 
Electronics- changed from vacuum 
tubes to transistors to integrated 
circuits to million transistor integrated 
circuits and suddenly something as big 
as a refrigerator was now on a chip, 
and you can actually put it in a little 
disk drive instead of in a separate 
giant box. Evolutionary change- not a 
single product change like MR heads. 
If you wanted to point at something- 
8” and 5.25” drives (because before 
that the disks were huge with giant 
control units)- huge shrinking in 1 
product. Allowed a lot of new 
applications for disk drives, not just 
data center at the bank anymore.” 
that’s sort of the high level 
overview of the business and 
infrastructure issue that IBM was 
dealing with in the early 90s/late 
80s.” 
 
3.  “They started out- not selling 
into the OEM business. The 5.25” 
disk drives were developed for 
internal IBM system platforms, as 
well as the 3.5” disk drives, and 
those divisions were not allowed 
to OEM those devices. So IBM 
was protecting their technology 
by not selling it to other 
companies. They were trying to 
protect their PC business, for 
example, by only allowing 
Fujisawa, Japan to ship disk 
drives for IBM PCs, wouldn’t let 
them sell them to HP or Atari or 
anyone else in the early days. 
They finally changed that but it 
was again too late. This gets back 
to everything getting driven out of 
Armonk, so these were strategic 
decisions that were made at the 
company but the decisions came 
too late. The decision to 
participate in the OEM market as 
a supplier of components came 
too late. It allowed the myriad of 
other disk drive developers and 
manufacturers to get a strong 
foothold because IBM could not 
get their cost structure under 
control fast enough.” 
 
4. “I really think that the long 
term strategists could see the 
emergence of the PC market 
pretty early. In fact IBM did a 
machine called the 5100 which 
was a basic ATL machine that 
weighed 50 lbs and would fit 
underneath the seat of an airplane, 
but that was really the first 
commercial portable computer. 
Albeit not very portable in 
today’s standards. But that came 
before PCs. SO IBM could see 
this coming and set up PC 
business as an independent 
company because they could see 
it coming. They saw it coming but 
they just couldn’t react fast 
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enough. Of course the margins in 
the PC business got- they went 
from 20% to 5% as many many 
new companies got involved in 
it.” 
 
5. “Margins were not there for 
new markets to make it worth 
entering. They exited disk drive 
business eventually for that 
reason- because the margins were 
not there. And they said- this was 
all part of a major transformation 
of IBM from a major vertically 
integrated company focused on 
hardware to a sales and services 
kind of company, with software. 
IBM made this huge huge 
transition, in the 90s, driven by 
the fact that they just couldn’t 
manage the low margins, couldn’t 
survive in that world, so they 
changed the direction of the 
company in a profound way, and 
I’m convinced that they would 
have failed if they hadn’t done 
that. It’s unusual for a company 
as old as it was at the time, 70-80 
years old at the time, to make this 
huge transition, and its business 
model, driving 400,000 people in 
a new direction. So again a result 
of IBM being able to look at the 
future pretty well, they just 
realized that they were never 
going to get their cost structure to 
the point where they could 
survive the low margins in the PC 
business, so they decided to exit it 
and go in a new direction.” 
 
6. “He thinks they moved into the 
PC business thinking that margins 
were going to be x%, and they 
ended up being x-20% or 
something like that.” 
 
7.“High volume commodity 
business- IBM didn’t understand. 
They didn’t think they thought the 
PC business was going to become 
so commoditized with the 
resulting margin erosion that 
happened. Once they figured that 
out, they just got out, closed the 
business down.” 
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8. “Emerging technology- there 
are early adopters and the 
volumes are low. Which is why 
big companies like IBM will 
move late into a market. It’s a 
matter of scale, so in the early 
days- IBM didn’t think it was 
worth going after 3.5”, 5.25” disk 
drives. I remember the 
discussions- “oh, there’s not 
going to be enough volume there. 
There’s an arrogance in the 
enterprise, high end disk drive 
business that the 5.25” drives 
were second rate and didn’t have 
the reliability that was needed, 
they were never going to make 
it.” 
 
9. “For small startups, what 
seemed small to IBM (50K 
units/yr or even 10K/yr) was a big 
deal to a startup. Seagate was Al 
Shugart in a garage. Able to grow 
their infrastructure and scale it as 
the business grew (didn’t have 
millions of dollars in salaries to 
pay every year), whereas IBM 
and other big firms like Imprimis 
started with a huge amount of 
overhead and just didn’t think this 
low end was going to grow as 
quickly as it did.” 
 
10. “i.e. Conner Peripherals 
supplying disk drives as a 
supplier to H-P for PCs- the big 
system houses like H-P would be 
trying to enter a new market, like 
a notebook, so they would go 
back to the drive supplier, in this 
case, Conner Peripherals, asking 
for a smaller drive, they were 
going to scale down the size of a 
computer to the point where it can 
become even more portable so I 
need a smaller disk drive. (JEAN 
NOTE: they found out about the 
new markets from their customers 
(H-P) who wanted to make a 
laptop or notebook or whatever). 
The other thing that happened of 
course was the areal density was 
doubling every 12-18 months, so 
the capacity of a disk drive soon 
 100 
outpaced the needs of a very low 
end entry level computer, and so 
the size and power requirements 
of the silicon was dropping at the 
same Moore’s Law rate, so it 
became obvious to many people 
that if you project that into the 
future who thought notebooks 
would be possible, even if a 
whole bunch of people did not 
think the market would be 
anything. Same argument people 
used when the markets for PC 
started- low level, entry-level 
device has a- only meets a modest 
set of requirements but it’s 
enough to get it started.” 
 
10. “The system houses that were 
looking to do notebooks or 
whatever emerging markets 
would go to their supplier and ask 
for smaller drives. Then Maxtor’s 
(or whoever’s) marketing people 
would go back to product 
developers and see if it was 
possible and start a new business 
line.” 
 
11. “The folks at Seagate slow at 
this- Conner much better (did 
early 2.5” drives)- bought Conner 
(and it’s 2.5” disk drive business) 
to solve this problem of late 
market entry.” 
 
12. “These startup companies had 
very little advanced technology 
work- were pretty market-driven. 
They’d wait for someone to ask 
them for something smaller. 
Margins were so low- they 
couldn’t afford the R&D unless 
they know the market is there. 
Seagate was a very large 
company when 2.5” business 
started, Conner was a startup 
(first product was 2.5” drive)- 
Innovator’s Dilemma type thing 
where new startup came in at very 
low end and established company 
was late to come to market. The 
reason it happens, in the generic 
sense is that lots of startups (9 out 
of 10) fail- because they picked 
the wrong market, usually.” 
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13. “Flaw in IBM’s thinking- 
unwillingness to participate in 
OEM business at any level- disk 
drive or component level- was a 
major error. IBM would not 
supply any components to the 
other HDD firms- wanted to 
protect their IP- but someone 
could reverse engineer the 
technology. So protecting your IP 
that way is fleeting- doesn’t last 
very long.” 
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APPENDIX B 
PATENT CLASS AND SUBCLASS DATA 
A sample of relevant patent subclasses (from the US Patent Office) under each of the three 
relevant classes of HDD patents: 360, 369, and 428. 
B.1 PATENT CLASS 360 
Patent Class 360: DYNAMIC MAGNETIC INFORMATION STORAGE OR RETRIEVAL 
 
1 RECORDING ON OR REPRODUCING FROM AN ELEMENT OF DIVERSE 
UTILITY 
2 .Card 
3 .Motion picture film 
4 MANUAL INPUT RECORDING 
5 RECORDING FOR SELECTIVE RETENTION OF A SPECIAL OCCURRENCE 
6 RECORDING COMBINED WITH METERING OR SENSING 
7 RECORDING FOR MONETARY DELAY OF AN ANALOG SIGNAL 
8 RECORDING FOR CHANGING DURATION,FREQUENCY OR REDUNDANT 
CONTENT OF AN ANALOG SIGNAL 
12 RECORDING OR REPRODUCING FOR AUTOMATIC ANNOUNCING 
13 RECORD EDITING 
15 RECORD COPYING 
16 .Contact transfer 
17 ..With magnetic bias 
18 RECORDING OR REPRODUCING PLURAL INFORMATION SIGNALS ON THE 
SAME TRACK 
 103 
20 .Frequency multiplex 
21 .Head gap azimuth multiplex 
22 SPLITTING ONE INFORMATION SIGNAL FOR RECORDING ON PLURAL 
DISTINCT TRACKS OR REPRODUCING SUCH SIGNAL 
23 .Time division 
24 SPLITTING, PROCESSING AND RECOMBINING ONE INFORMATION 
SIGNAL FOR RECORDING OR REPRODUCING ON THE SAME TRACK 
25 CHECKING RECORD CHARACTERISTICS OR MODIFYING RECORDING 
SIGNAL FOR CHARACTERISTIC COMPENSATION 
26 ELECTRONICALLY CORRECTING PHASING ERRORS BETWEEN RELATED 
INFORMATION SIGNALS 
27 RECORDING OR REPRODUCING AN INFORMATION SIGNAL AND A 
CONTROL SIGNAL FOR CONTROLLING ELECTRONICS OF REPRODUCER 
28 .Reference carrier to control demodulator 
29 MODULATING OR DEMODULATING 
30 .Frequency 
31 MONITORING OR TESTING THE PROGRESS OF RECORDING 
32 CONVERTING AN ANALOG SIGNAL TO DIGITAL FORM FOR RECORDING; 
REPRODUCING AND RECONVERTING 
39 GENERAL PROCESSING OF A DIGITAL SIGNAL 
40 .In specific code or form 
41 ..Nonreturn to zero 
42 ..Phase code 
43 ..Multi-frequency 
44 ..Intra-cell transition 
45 .Pulse crowding correction 
 
B.2 PATENT CLASS 369 
Patent Class 369: DYNAMIC MAGNETIC INFORMATION STORAGE OR RETRIEVAL 
 
Examples of subclass definitions relevant to HDD: 
13.01 STORAGE OR RETRIEVAL BY SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF 
DIVERSE TYPES OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION 
13.02 .Magnetic field and light beam 
13.03 ..Initializing 
13.04 ..Erasing 
13.05 ..Reading 
13.06 ...By transferring magnetic domain between layers 
13.07 ....Three or more magnetic layers 
13.08 .....Changing size of magnetic domain 
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13.09 ....Changing size of magnetic domain 
13.1 ..Three or more magnetic states 
13.11 ..Positioning of transducer assembly for storage or retrieval 
13.12 ..Relative positioning of transducer assemblies 
13.13 ..Integral transducers 
13.14 ..Magnetic field generation 
13.15 ...Leakage magnetic field 
13.16 ...Overwriting 
13.17 ...Magnetic field transducer assembly 
13.18 ....Permanent magnet 
13.19 .....Rotating magnet 
13.2 ....Operative location positioning of transducer assembly 
13.21 .....During load and unload of storage medium 
13.22 ...Magnetic field generating circuit 
13.23 ....Conductor coil 
13.24 ..Light beam generation 
13.25 ...Overwriting 
13.26 ...Setting light beam power level 
13.27 ....Based on referenced test signal 
B.3 PATENT CLASS 428 
Patent Class 428: STOCK MATERIAL OR MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES 
Examples of subclass definitions relevant to HDD: 
800 MAGNETIC RECORDING COMPONENT OR 
STOCK 
810 .Magnetic head 
811 ..Magnetoresistive 
811.1 ...Having tunnel junction effect 
811.2 ...Multilayer 
811.3 ....Super lattice (e.g., giant magneto resistance (GMR) or colossal magneto 
resistance (CMR), etc.) 
811.4 ...Single film 
811.5 ...With defined structural feature 
812 ..Magnetic layer composition 
813 ..Substrate composition 
814 ..With protective film 
815 ..With defined laminate structural detail 
815.1 ...Head with slider structure 
815.2 ...With head pole component 
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816 ..With interlaminar component 
(e.g., adhesion layer, etc.) 
817 .Magneto-optical media stock 
818 ..Multiple magnetic layers, at least one of which is magnetooptic 
819 ...Unit structure (i.e., three or more differing magnetic layers 
in series)  
819.1 ....Reoccurring unit structure 
819.2 ....Only three adjacent magnetic layers form series 
819.3 ....Only four or six adjacent magnetic layers form series 
819.4 .....Magnetic layers and at least one intervening nonmagnetic layer (e.g., 
antiferromagnetic, dielectric,etc.) 
820 ...Only two magnetic layers, at least one of which is magnetooptic 
820.1 ....Magnetic layer pairs separated by single nonmagnetic (e.g., antiferromagnetic, 
dielectric,etc.) layer 
820.2 ....Adjacent magnetic layers 
820.3 .....Having in-plane orientated magnetization 
820.4 .....Magnetic layer composition specified 
820.5 .....Specified performance related property (e.g., Kerr rotation, etc.) 
820.6 ......Curie temperature 
821 ..Single magneto-optic magnetic layer 
822 ...Magneto-optic magnetic layer contains transition metal 
822.1 ....Magnetic transition metal oxide in magneto-optic layer 
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APPENDIX C 
LITERATURE REVIEW TABLES 
C.1 LITERATURE REVIEW TABLE ON TECHNOLOGICAL, MARKET AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Authors Systems Change 
Adner (2002) market 
Bryce and Dyer (2007) market 
Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) market 
Danneels (2003) market 
Danneels (2004) market 
Jacobides et al. (2006) market 
Kim and Mauborgne (1999) market 
Porter (2008)  market 
Rosenbloom and Christensen (1998) market 
Rothaermel (2001) market 
Rothaermel and Hill (2005) market 
Teece (1986) market 
Tripsas (1997) market 
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MacMillan and Selden (2008) organization 
Aiken and Hage (1971) organization 
Amburgey et al. (1993) organization 
Barney (1991) organization 
Benner and Tushman (2002) organization 
Burgelman (1991) organization 
Cardinal (2001) organization 
Cattani (2005) organization 
Chesbrough (2005) organization 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000) organization 
Damanpour (1991) organization 
Dougherty and Hardy (1996) organization 
Dyer (1996) organization 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) organization 
Garud and Munir (2008) organization 
Hage (1999) organization 
Hannan (1984) organization 
Helfat and Leiberman (2002) organization 
Hillman et al. (2009) organization 
Iansiti et al.(2003) organization 
Katz and Allen (1982) organization 
King and Tucci (2000) organization 
Langlois (1997) organization 
Levinthal and March (1993) organization 
Macher and Richman (2004) organization 
Pierce and Delbecq (1977) organization 
Puranam et al. (2006) organization 
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Rosenberg (1976) organization 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) organization 
Sandström et al. (2009) organization 
Smith et al. (2005) organization 
Thomond et al. (2003) organization 
Tripsas (2009) organization 
Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) organization 
Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) organization 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) organization 
Volberda and Elfring (2001) organization 
Westerman et al. (2006) organization 
King and Tucci (2002) organization and market 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) organization and market 
Macher and Richman (2004) organization and market 
Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010) organization and market 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) organization and market 
Christensen and Bower (1996) organization and market 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) organization and market 
Brusoni et al. (2001) technology 
Glasmeier (1991) technology 
Henderson and Clark (1990) technology 
Jiang et al. (2010) technology 
Kapoor and Adner (2012) technology 
Rothaermel and Thursby (2007) technology 
Sosa (2011) technology 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) technology 
Adner and Kapoor (2010) technology and market 
Ansari and Garud (2009) technology and market 
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Christensen (1997) technology and market 
Lazonick (1991) technology and market 
D’Aveni (2002) technology and organization 
Hoetker (2005) technology and organization 
Rosenbloom (2000) technology and organization 
Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) technology and organization 
Sosa (2009) technology and organization 
Yu and Hang (2009) technology and organization 
Taylor and Helfat (2009) market, organizational, and technology 
Hill and Rothaermel (2003),  market, organizational, and technology 
Klepper and Simons (2000) market, organizational, and technology 
 
C.2 LITERATURE REVIEW TABLE ON KNOWLEDGE AND PRODUCTION 
BOUNDARIES 
Authors Year Findings Type of boundary 
Kogut, B., 
Zander, U. 996 
Def of knowledge boundaries: “It is not transaction costs, but 
the social knowledge embedded in the competence of 
individuals and the organizing principles of work that explains 
what firms are on the basis of what they know how to do. We 
propose that the boundaries of firms demarcate qualitative 
changes in the reservoir of social knowledge available to 
economic agents (i.e., people) because coordination and 
learning are developed within the organizational context of 
shared identities. This shared identity does not only lower the 
costs of communication, but establishes explicit and tacit rules 
of coordination and influences the direction of search and 
learning.” knowledge  
Laursen K, 
Salter A 006 
market knowledge enhanced by exposure to diversity of rivals 
and clients. market knowledge 
Taylor, A., & 
Greve, H. R. 006 
"multiple knowledge domains produce novel combinations 
that increase the variance of product performance and that 
extensive experience produces outputs with high average 
performance." market knowledge 
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Zhou, K. Z., Li, 
C.B. 012 
"A firm with a broad knowledge base is more likely to achieve 
radical innovation in the presence of internal knowledge 
sharing rather than market knowledge acquisition. In contrast, 
a firm with a deep knowledge base is more capable of 
developing radical innovation through market knowledge 
acquisition rather than internal knowledge sharing." (our 
interpretation: firms more likely to spot emerging market 
opportunities for tech commercialization when exposed to 
different market stimuli.) market knowledge 
Miller, D., & 
Chen, M. J 994 
Exposure to different market stimuli will have a negative 
effect on organizational inertia 
market knowledge 
(prod diversity) 
Miller, D., & 
Chen, M. J.  996 
exposure to different markets, rivals, customers will increase a 
firm's market knowledge 
market knowledge 
(prod diversity) 
Abrahamson, E., 
& Fombrun, C. 
J. 994 
Interorganizational phenomena-particularly beliefs widely 
shared by managers across related organizations-are also to 
blame for the collective failure of industries.  
market knowledge 
(product diversity) 
Ahuja, G., 
Lampert, C. 001 
Experimenting with novel (i.e., technologies in which the firm 
lacks prior experience), emerging (technologies that are recent 
or newly developed in the industry), and pioneering 
(technologies that do not build on any existing technologies) 
technologies allow firms to create breakthrough inventions. 
market knowledge 
(product diversity) 
Barkema, H. G., 
& Vermeulen, F. 998 
"A firm that leverages its technological capabilities into 
multiple businesses will be exposed to a richer set of demand 
characteristics (cf. Argyres, 1996a], rivals, suppliers, and 
partners than a firm operating in a single business. Leveraging 
technological capabilities into multiple businesses may also 
lead to economies of scale and scope, which may increase the 
returns from innovation while spreading the risks (Peteraf, 
1993; Teece, 1982]. Hence, product diversity also fosters 
innovation." 
market knowledge 
(product diversity) 
Tallman, S., Li, 
J. 996 
For a sample of large American industrial multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), it showed a consistent quadratic 
relationship between product diversification and MNE 
performance 
but minimal performance differences across different 
measures of international diversity. 
market knowledge 
(product diversity) 
Benner, M. J., & 
Tripsas, M.  011 
“(1) prior industry experience shapes a set of shared beliefs 
that results in similar and concurrent firm behavior; (2) firms 
notice and imitate the behaviors of firms from the same prior 
industry; and, (3) as firms gain experience with particular 
features, the influence of prior industry decreases.” 
market knowledge 
and market 
production 
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Christensen, C. 
M., 
Rosenbloom, R. 
S. 995 
“The value network--the context within which a firm competes 
and solves customers' problems--is an important factor 
affecting whether incumbent or entrant firms will most 
successfully innovate. In a study of technology development in 
the disk drive industry, the authors found that incumbents led 
the industry in developing and adopting new technologies of 
every sort identified by earlier scholars --at component and 
architectural levels; competency-enhancing and competency-
destroying; incremental and radical--as long as the technology 
addressed customers' needs within the value network in which 
the incumbents competed. Entrants led in developing and 
adopting technologies which addressed user needs in different, 
emerging value networks. It is in these innovations, which 
disrupted established trajectories of technological progress in 
established markets, that attackers proved to have an 
advantage.” 
market knowledge 
and market 
production 
Christensen, C. 
M., Suarez, F. 
F., Utterback, J. 
M 998 
“Results suggest that entry strategies that entail market risk 
(entering an emerging market with proven component 
techology- what the new entrants did and the established firms 
struggled with) may be less risky than strategies that entail 
technological risk (entering an established market with new 
component technology- what the established firms did).” 
market knowledge 
and market 
production 
Tripsas, M., & 
Gavetti, G. 000 
"Little theoretical attention has been devoted in this tradition 
to understanding how managerial cognition affects the 
adaptive intelligence of organizations. Through an in-depth 
case study of the response of the Polaroid Corporation to the 
ongoing shift from analog to digital imaging, we expand upon 
this work by examining the relationship between managers' 
understanding of the world and the accumulation of 
organizational capabilities. The Polaroid story clearly 
illustrates the importance of managerial cognitive 
representations in directing search processes in a new learning 
environment, the evolutionary trajectory of organizational 
capabilities, and ultimately processes of organizational 
adaptation" OUR INTERPRETATION: firms' views of new 
markets are shaped by prior beliefs/cognition/experience in 
older markets, which can lead to erroneous decisions regarding 
features/performance for new product- not what customers 
want. 
market knowledge 
and market 
production 
Anderson, E., 
Schmittlein, DC. 984 
Integration of sales force leads to asset specificity, difficulty of 
performance evaluation, and the combination of 
these two factors. market production 
Christensen, C. 
M. 997 
Established firms paid attention to existing customers and their 
needs (chose to invest in expensive component tech), new 
entrants looked at new markets with different trajectories in 
performance requirements and addressed those markets. market production 
John, G., & 
Weitz, B. A. 988 
“We saw that firms were less likely to use reseller channels 
when specific assets levels were higher. Similar shifts were 
observed for higher levels of environmental uncertainty and 
behavioral uncertainty.” market production 
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Klein, S., 
Frazier, G. L., & 
Roth, V. J. 990 
“An important contingency when deciding on channel 
structure in a foreign country is the ability of the market to 
limit the opportunistic tendencies of outside intermediaries. 
When the enforcement of contractual arrangements cannot be 
relied upon in the market, different degrees of forward 
integration are feasible alternatives. Other empirical results 
suggest that the firm may prefer use of intermediaries in a 
foreign market with high environmental adversity in order to 
cope with its inherent complexity and maintain flexibility. 
Channel volume, the use of shared channels, and country 
destinations also are shown to affect the nature of integration 
in channels in international markets.” market production 
Rothaermel, F. 
T. 001 
“Incumbents may be in a position to adapt to radical 
technological change via interfirm cooperation with new 
entrants when the incumbents have complementary assets 
within their firm boundaries that are critical to 
commercializing the new technology. We find that an 
incumbent’s alliances with providers of the new technology 
are positively associated with the incumbent’s new product 
development and, in turn, new product development is 
positively associated with firm performance. At the industry-
level, we show that incumbents exhibit a preference towards 
alliances that leverage complementary assets (exploitation 
alliances) over alliances that focus on building new 
technological competencies (exploration alliances). In 
addition, the cooperation between incumbents and new 
entrants may contribute to an improvement in incumbent 
industry performance.” market production 
Rothaermel, F. 
T., Hill, C.W.L. 005 
“The type of complementary assets (generic versus 
specialized) needed to commercialize a new technology is 
critical in determining the industry- and firm-level 
performance implications of a competence-destroying 
technological discontinuity. Iincumbent industry performance 
declines if the new technology can be commercialized through 
generic complementary assets, whereas incumbent industry 
performance improves if the new technology can be 
commercialized through specialized complementary assets. An 
incumbent firm's financial strength has a stronger positive 
impact on firm performance in the postdiscontinuity time 
period if the new technology can be commercialized through 
generic complementary assets. An incumbent firm's R&D 
capability has a stronger positive impact on firm performance 
in the postdiscontinuity time period if the new technology can 
be commercialized through specialized complementary 
assets.” market production 
Tripsas, M. 997 
"In this industry, specialized complementary assets played a 
crucial role in buffering incumbents from the effects of 
competence destruction" market production 
Christensen, C. 
M.  993 
Defines disruptive change as a shift in the trajectory of 
performance improvement in established markets. New 
markets difficult for established firms to recognize. 
market production 
and market 
knowledge 
Ahuja, G., 
Katila, R. 001 
 
In technological acquisitions, firms are exposed to a new 
knowledge base that will allow them to create unique 
recombinations of knowledge when the knowledge bases are 
combined. 
technological 
knowledge 
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Butler, J. C., & 
Grahovac, J. 012 
Knowledge boundary def: sum of all the individual 
knowledge, and the routines/rules/decision rights the firm uses 
to access that knowledge (more of a capabilities argument- 
have to have certain org structure/hierarchy in place in order to 
access knowledge stores) 
technological 
knowledge 
Carlile, P. R. 002 
Knowledge boundaries: obstacle getting in the way of 
problem solving (specialized knowledge within the firm 
creates them): “The characteristics of knowledge that drive 
innovative problem solving within a function actually hinder 
problem solving and knowledge creation across functions. 
knowledge and learning is structured by the types of problems 
faced within a practice (Lave and Wenger (1991), Brown and 
Duguid (1991), and Orr (1996)). Knowledge is embedded in 
practice and also embedded in the technologies, methods, and 
rules of thumb used by individuals in a given practice.” 
technological 
knowledge 
Cohen, W. M., 
Levinthal, D. A. 990 
"The ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commerciai ends is 
critical to its innovative capabilities. We label this capability a 
firm's absorptive capacity and suggest that it is largely a 
function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge." 
technological 
knowledge 
Feldman, M. S., 
& Pentland, B. 
T. 003 
“We argue that the relationship between ostensive (structure) 
and performative (action) aspects of routines creates an on-
going opportunity for variation, selection, and retention of new 
practices and patterns of action within routines and allows 
routines to generate a wide range of outcomes, from apparent 
stability to considerable change.” 
technological 
knowledge 
Fleming, L., & 
Sorenson, O. 001 
If a firm's R&D department has experimented with different 
component combinations, they may be able to incorporate 
componet changes faster because of the knowledge generated 
from their previous experimentation. 
technological 
knowledge 
Garicano, L., & 
Wu, Y. 012 
Def of knowledge boundaries: knowledge here seems more 
task specific- each individual does a task and has the 
knowledge to complete that task, and there is knowledge 
sharing amongst individuals to complete new tasks that require 
combined knowledge. Knowledge that can be codified can be 
outsourced, while the more tacit stuff cannot be because it’s 
too costly to communicate it (KBV approach?). Uses 
communication as a coordination mechanism (works well with 
our interaction term argument). “knowledge-based production, 
knowledge is the main input. In this paper, we focus on the 
type of knowledge that satisfies two conditions: (1) knowledge 
that is used to solve specific problems, e.g., know-how or 
expertise; and (2) knowledge that is embodied in the human 
mind and is thus talent.” 
technological 
knowledge 
Grant, R. M. 996 
Knowledge is viewed as residing within the individual, and the 
primary role of the organization is knowledge application 
rather than knowledge creation. Org knowledge= knowledge 
of many individuals that can be used for production. 
Knowledge that is difficult to share efficiently across firm 
boundaries will be integrated within firm. 
technological 
knowledge 
Sorenson, O., 
McEvily, S., 
Ren, C. R., & 
Roy, R. 006 
"To attain broad scope, firms must repeatedly explore outside 
the boundaries of their current niche. Firms with broad niches 
therefore operate under a set of routines that repeatedly propel 
them into new market segments, expanding their niche." 
technological 
knowledge 
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Tushman, M. L., 
Anderson, P. 986 
describe a competence-destroying technological discontinuity 
as a situation where the processes, skills, and knowledge bases 
for an older technology are no longer relevant or have become 
dramatically less valuable in a particular market 
technological 
knowledge 
Yayavaram, S., 
Ahuja, G. 008 
"Results show that a nearly decomposable knowledge base 
increases the usefulness of the inventions generated from it, as 
measured by patent citations, and also the knowledge base's 
malleability or capacity for change." (our interpretation: firms 
that are able to decompose knowledge/have coupling 
knowledge about different components will be better able to 
anticipate interactions as technology changes) 
technological 
knowledge 
Zander, U., 
Kogut, B. 995 
"The determinants of the time to imitation are found to be the 
extent to which knowledge of the manufacturing processes is 
"common" among competitors, and the degree of continuous 
recombination of capabilities leading to improvement of the 
product or the manufacturing process." 
technological 
knowledge 
Sorenson, O. 003 
"Firms face a trade-off. In stable environments, vertically 
integrating severely limits the organization's ability to learn by 
doing because boundedly rational managers find the 
optimization of operations difficult when making highly 
interdependent choices. As the volatility of the environment 
increases though, integration can facilitate learning-by-doing 
by buffering activities within the firm from instability in the 
external environment. Thus, firms with a high degree of 
interdependence suffer less in these environments." ALSO: 
"Whereas nonintegrated firms must respond to the actions of 
outside producers, integrated firms have the ability to direct 
the actions of internal suppliers. Consider the example of Intel 
and IBM mentioned above. While a firm that sources its CPU 
from Intel must adapt to whatever Intel chooses to do (or adapt 
by locating a new supplier), IBM can order its captive unit to 
refrain from making radical changes until other parts of the 
organization have the capacity to accommodate the change. 
Hence, by increasing the predictability of future development 
paths and component supplies, vertical integration reduces the 
firm's exposure to external volatility." 
technological 
knowledge and 
techhological 
production 
Balachandra, R. 002 
Modular design allows firms to outsource production, but 
component changes create interface changes that cause firms 
to have to redsign products. 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Brusoni, S., 
Prencipe, A., 
Pavitt, K.  001 
“We show that multitechnology firms need to have knowledge 
In excess of what they need for what they make, to cope with 
imbalances caused by uneven rates of development in the 
technologies on which they rely and with unpredictable 
product-level interdependencies. By knowing more, 
muttitechnology firms can coordinate loosely coupled 
networks of suppliers of equipment, components, and 
specialized knowledge and maintain a capability for systems 
integration.” 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Ciravegna, L. 
M., G. 012 
Firms cannot outsource core design development, because it 
creates system integration issues (Firms need knowledge re: 
the component technologies they outsource or they will not be 
able to integrate them into their design, and address customer 
needs/performance requirements.) 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
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Granstrand, O., 
P Patel, and K. 
Pavitt 997 
Large firms are more diversified in the technologies that they 
master than the products that they make and that their 
technological diversity has been increasing while they have 
typically been narrowing their product range. 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Hoetker, G. 005 
Firms would prefer to use suppliers they already have 
relationships with than that have the most tech prowess, 
suggesting that communication between R&D and 
manufacturing is essential when technology changes.  
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Kapoor, R., 
Adner, R 012 
"vertically integrated firms had, on average, a faster time to 
market for new product generations than nonintegrated firms. 
The performance benefit that firms 
derived from vertical integration was greater when the new 
product generation was enabled by architectural change than 
when it was enabled by component change. We also find that 
although many nonintegrated firms extended their knowledge 
boundaries by developing knowledge of outsourced 
components, the performance benefits from such knowledge 
mostly accrued to “fully nonintegrated” firms (i.e., those that 
did not vertically integrate into any upstream component), 
rather than “partially integrated” firms (i.e., those that 
vertically integrated into some components but not others)." 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Negro, G., 
Sorenson, O. 006 
"Vertical integration appears to change 
the dynamics of competition in two ways: (i) it buffers the 
vertically integrated firms from environmental dependence 
and (ii) it intensifies competition among non-integrated 
organizations." (our interpretation: firms that make their own 
supply may be able to develop the competency to 
manufacture/integrate new technology faster than waiting for 
outside suppliers). 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Prencipe, A. 997 
Aircraft engine manufacturers retain technological knowledge 
about components where production is fully outsourced. 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Takeishi, A. 002 
“For regular projects, it is more important for the automaker to 
have a higher level of architectural knowledge (how to 
coordinate various components for a vehicle) than of 
component-specific knowledge, which is supposed to be 
provided by the supplier. However, when the project involves 
new technology for the supplier, it is important for the 
automaker to have a higher level of component-specific 
knowledge to solve unexplored engineering problems together 
with the supplier. In innovative projects, effective knowledge 
partitioning seems to demand some overlap between an 
automaker and a supplier, rather than efficient and clear-cut 
boundaries that are optimal for regular projects.” 
technological 
knowledge and 
technological 
production 
Adner, R., 
Kapoor, R. 010 
Because vertical integration mitigates contractual hazards but 
not necessarily technological challenges, the shifting balance 
of technological and contractual uncertainty will increase the 
benefit from vertical integration over the course of the 
technology life cycle. So vertical integration is more effective 
after a technology has reached maturity, rather than during its 
emergence. 
technological 
production 
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Afuah, A. 001 
After a tech change (competence destroying), firms that are 
VI-ed into new tech will perform better than firms that are not. 
Firms that were VI-ed into old technology will be worse off 
than those firms that were not. 
technological 
production 
Arrow, K. J.  975 
Uncertainty in the supply of the upstream good and the need 
for information by downstream firms makes VI a good choice. 
technological 
production 
Balakrishnan, S., 
Wernerfelt, B. 986 
General uncertainty makes VI more attractive, but one 
particular kind (possibility of tech obsolescence) makes VI 
less attractive. 
technological 
production 
Funk, J.  009 
Improvements in one area change the tradeoffs that exist 
between price and different dimensions of performance and 
between various design choices and thus lead to technological 
discontinuities in system design. 
technological 
production 
Harrigan, K. R. 984 
avoid integrating into manufacturing if assets are in danger of 
becoming technologically obsolete 
technological 
production 
Harrigan, K. R. 985 
"Positive changes in sales growth (demand uncertainty), 
particularly those associated with obsolescence from rapid 
technological change, discourage integration." 
technological 
production 
Jones, G. R., & 
Hill, C. W. L. 988 
Strategy-structure choice (defined by TCE) is influenced 
negatively by tech uncertainty. "Thus, as a consequence 
of technological change, firms may change strategy, moving 
from related to unrelated diversification when technology is in 
ferment and moving the opposite way when it stabilizes." 
technological 
production 
Rosenberg, N. 976 
"technological progress in one component may alter what is 
needed from other components within a device, forcing firms 
to make architectural changes in order to improve overall 
device performance"  
technological 
production 
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